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I. Bank Regulation and Supervision in France
A. GENERALLY
Bank regulation and supervision in France reflect strains relating to the
recent completion of the nationalization of the banking industry and a
strong focus on the development of a banking industry that will serve the
needs of French industrial policy and French exporters. The French super-
visory system has its basis in a comprehensive statute and extensive written
regulations, but it is not as rule-based as the United States system. Nor does
it possess the consultative features of the United Kingdom system. The
Banque de France and the Commission Bancaire exert powerful authority
over the larger French banks. The close association between supervisors and
major banks that some observers see as a distinguishing characteristic of the
bank regulatory and supervisory system in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many is noticeably lacking in France.
Beginning in late 1985, an extensive reform package was adopted in
France. The reforms included such measures as allowing the introduction of
certificates of deposit, permitting the issuance of stock options, easing the
rules for bond issuance and allowing banks to offer long-term mortgages.
These reforms were intended to keep French capital markets competitive
with those elsewhere in Western Europe. 1
1. E. Wallace, French Banking: Moving into the Future, Am. Banker, Nov. 22, 1985, at 7.
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1. The French Banking Act
The Banking Law of January 24, 1984 (the French Banking Act), which
represents the first major change in bank supervision since 1945, brought
most French banking and credit institutions under a single supervisory
structure. 2 That structure, however, is fairly complex, because supervision
is exercised through four separate entities: the Commission Bancaire, the
Comite de la Reglementation Bancaire, the Comite des Etablissements de
Credit and the Conseil National du Credit. The French Banking Act also
had the unstated objective of increasing the government's intervention in
regulation of banks by increasing the supervisory responsibilities and func-
tions of the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Budget.3 As a result of the
nationalizations of 1945 and 1982, the French government now owns all
large commercial banks that are not foreign controlled.4
2. The Banque de France and the
Commission Bancaire
The Banque de France has traditionally enjoyed very significant authority'
over commercial banks and its authority has been strengthened by the
French Banking Act. 5 It has general authority to supervise the French
banking system and is charged with carrying out the economic and financial
policies of the government. 6 In practice, much of the authority of the
2. Law No. 88-46, Loi relative a l'activite et au controle des etablissements de credit, Jan.
24, 1984, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Francaise (J.O.), Jan. 25, 1984, at 390 [hereinafter
referred to as the French Banking Act]. The French Banking Act and implementing regulations
became effective on July 24, 1984. The French Banking Act reflected in part the suggestions of
the Mayoux Report, commissioned in 1979 by the government of Raymond Barre. See
C. Johnson, France, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING 85 (Ernst & Whinney, eds. 1985).
Prior to effectiveness of the French Banking Act, banks were divided into deposit banks
(banques de depot), investment banks (banques d'affaires) and medium- and long-term credit
banks. In addition to the French Banking Act, the following are among the more important
statutes governing commercial banks in France: (a) Law No. 2532 of June 13, 1941, 1941 J.O.,
setting forth basic regulations for banks generally; (b) Law No. 45-015 of Dec. 2, 1945, 1945
J.O., relating to the nationalization of the Banque de France and large commercial banks;
(c) Decree No. 46-1247 of May 17, 1946, 1946 J.O., setting forth basic rules for functioning of
private sector banks; (d) Law No. 73-7 of Jan. 3, 1973, 1973 J.O., relating to the Banque de
France; (e) Decree of Nov. 13, 1978, 1978 J.O., establishing minimum capital requirements for
banks; and (f) Decree No. 79-561 of July 5, 1979, 1979 J.O., introducing rules for covering and
spreading lending risks. For a complete listing of pre-1981 statutes and regulations, see THE
REGULATION OF BANKS IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EEC at 60 (Welch, J. ed. 1980) [herein-
after cited as WELCH].
3. Riggs, French Banking Law Changes, 2 INT'L L. BULL. 27 (1984).
4. Over 80 percent of all deposits in France are held by banking institutions under govern-
ment control. Senate Report No. 40, Projet de Loi No. 456, 2d Extra. Sess. (1982-1983), at 25.
Some 39 banks were nationalized in February 1982. The three largest French banks, Banque
Nationale de Paris, Credit Lyonnais and Societe Generale, were nationalized in 1945.
5. Interviews, senior officials of major French banks, Paris, February 9-10, 1984, and May
30, 1985 (notes on file with author).
6. Law No. 73-7 of Jan. 3, 1973, art. 1(1), reprinted in c. com. app. IV (Petits Codes Dalloz).
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Banque de France is exercised indirectly, particularly through its preemi-
nent position on the Banking Commission (Commission Bancaire). The
Banque de France appoints the Secretary-General of the Commission Ban-
caire and serves as its secretariat. 7 Moreover, it is through the Banque de
France that the Commission Bancaire acts to verify the accounting records
and legal compliance of all French banking institutions.8
The Commission Bancaire replaces the former Commission de Controle
des Banques (the CCB) and has greater powers. 9 Its members include the
Governor of the Banque de France, the director of the Treasury Depart-
ment, a judge from each of the Conseil d'Etat and the Cour de Cassation,
and two banking experts appointed by the Minister of Economy, Finance
and Budget. 10 Pursuant to the French Banking Act, the Commission Ban-
caire is charged with insuring that banking institutions adhere to applicable
rules and regulations.'
The Commission Bancaire is responsible for auditing the accounts of
banking institutions. 12 The Commission Bancaire's inspections, carried out
by representatives of the Banque de France, are followed by reports that are
presented to a bank's board and its statutory auditors. 13 The Commission
Bancaire also has the power to control branches and subsidiaries of French
banks operating abroad, a power which eluded the CCB. 14 The Commission
Bancaire is charged with official responsibility for insuring the general safety
and soundness of banking institutions in France.
The work of the Commission Bancaire is supplemented by the Committee
on Bank Regulation (Comite de la Reglementation Bancaire). 15 It consists
of the Minister of Economy, Finance and Budget, his four appointees and
the Governor of the Banque de France, as well as one representative chosen
by the Association Francaise des Etablissements de Credit (an organization
representing all credit institutions), a trade union representative and two
financial experts chosen without regard to professional affiliation. 16 The
Comite de la Reglementation Bancaire is charged with developing specific
regulations applicable to banking institutions. Development of uniform
accounting standards and a standardized format for commercial bank finan-
7. Federal Reserve Board, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OFTEN
NATIONS AND SWITZERLAND (1984) [hereinafter cited as Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten],
at 26.
8. French Banking Act, supra note 2, at art. 39(2).
9. Id., at arts. 37-49.
10. Id., at art. 38.
11. Id., at arts. 37, 39.
12. Id., at arts. 39, 46.
13. C. Johnson, France, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 2, at 87.
14. Marsh, A Key Step in Series of Banking Reforms, Fin. Times, Dec. 2, 1983, Sec. IV, at
13; interview, officials of CCB, Paris, Feb. 8, 1984 (notes on file with author).
15. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 26.
16. French Banking Act, supra note 2, at art. 30(2).
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cial statements are among its responsibilities. It also establishes prudential
regulations and ratios and determines which activities are permissible bank-
ing activities under the French Banking Act.17
Yet another official supervisory body is the Comite des Etablissements de
Credit. 18 It provides authorization for the commencement of banking activi-
ties and is responsible for the technical application of various banking
regulations to individual commercial banks. 19 Its members are the Gov-
ernor of the Banque de France, the director of the Treasury Department
and four members appointed by the Minister of Economy, Finance and
Budget. 20 The enlarged role of the Comite des Etablissements de Credit
indicates that the real power of decision on credit matters has shifted from
the Banque de France to the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Budget. 2'
The Conseil National du Credit is a consultative group comprised of the
Minister of Economy, Finance and Budget, the Governor of the Banque de
France and representatives of certain consumer, employer and employee
organizations.2 2 Pursuant to art. 24(2) of the French Banking Act, it is
charged with advising the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Budget on
matters relating to the general functioning of the banking and financial
systems as well as on monetary and credit policy. 23 The present consultative
role of the Conseil National du Credit represents a significant reduction of
its pre-1984 authority.
24
Several other governmental entities are also influential in the supervision
of banking activities. The Treasury Department is a powerful central finan-
cial institution and exerts a strong influence on the conduct of the banking
business in France. Since the Treasury Department issues guarantees in
favor of private enterprises and may make loans to such enterprises if their
work is deemed to be in the national interest, it functions in these respects as
a bank.25
3. Commercial Banks and
the Supervisory Process
French banks are among the largest banks in the world, but are generally
not among the most adequately capitalized or profitable.26 Especially in the
17. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 26; French Banking Act, supra
note 2 at art. 33.
18. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 27.
19. Id.; French Banking Act, supra note 2, at art. 15.
20. French Banking Act, supra note 2, at art. 31(2).
21. Riggs, supra note 3, at 29.
22. French Banking Act, supra note 2, at art. 25.
23. Id., at art. 24(2).
24. Riggs, supra note 3, at 28.
25. BORDE, Doing Business in France (New York: Matthew Bender, 1985), 15.02 at 15-7.
26. The largest French banks include Banque Nationale de Paris, Credit Agricole, Credit
Lyonnais, Societe Generale, Banque Paribas, Banque Indosuez, Credit Industrial et Commer-
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wake of the relatively complete nationalization of commercial banks under-
taken in 1982, French banks have had to come to terms with a complex
supervisory structure. Post-nationalization supervision has not significantly
improved either capital structure or profitability.
A number of common themes emerged from discussions with officials of
French banks. First, there is the frequently expressed view that relations
between the Banque de France and commercial banks are very different
from relations between the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve Board
and United Kingdom or United States commercial banks. While interfer-
ence from the Banque de France in the day-to-day operations of banks is
said to be minimal, banks view relationships with supervisors with a certain
amount of skepticism and note their sometimes adversarial nature.
Another common theme of bank executives is approval of foreign lending
which supports French export goals. Most banks report that export-related
loans guaranteed by the French government constitute significant percent-
ages of their total foreign loans. Finally, leading bankers express concern
that French banks lack the necessary capital to underwrite greater exposure
in foreign lending that is not supported by government guarantees.2 7
French banks are encouraged to express their opinions on matters such as
foreign lending through the Association Francaise des Banques (AFB). The
AFB was established in 1941 and assumed its present name in 1976. It enjoys
quasi-official status and banks are required to become members. The AFB
is, in fact, a part of the supervisory structure and often serves to inform
banks of various government policies. In cases where a bank is party to a suit
or where the general interests of the banking profession are otherwise at
stake, the AFB is entitled to intervene in judicial actions.2 8 As one observer
notes, "the AFB thus has a formal place in the supervisory framework of the
banking industry, both as regards access to the profession and as regards the
disciplining of those in the profession. "29
4. Accounting and
Disclosure Requirements
The French Banking Act has tightened up certain accounting require-
ments. Under the terms of the French Banking Act, accountants are re-
quired to report specified matters to the Ministry of Justice after discussing
cial, Groupe des Banques Populaires, Banque Francaise du Commerce Exterieur and Credit
Commercial de France.
27. Interviews, senior officials of major French banks, Paris, Feb. 9-10, 1984, and May 30,
1985; interviews, senior officials of the Association Francaise des Banques (AFB), Paris, Feb.
7, 1984 (notes on file with author). See also Marsh, supra note 14, at 6.
28. WELCH, France, supra note 2, at 81-82.
29. Id. at 82; interview, senior official of the AFB, Paris, Feb. 7, 1984 (notes on file with
author).
VOL. 20. NO. I
INTERNATIONAL BANK LENDING: PART II 161
them with bank management. The French Banking Act grants greater
enforcement powers to the Commission Bancaire than were enjoyed by the
CCB. Commission Bancaire officials also predicted that EEC directives on
bank accounting practices would result in stricter accounting controls for
French banks.30
Each French bank is required to send a periodic statement of its assets and
liabilities to the Commission Bancaire. 3 1 French banks must submit interim
reports at the end of every six-month period and balance sheets, profit and
loss accounts and certain additional information at the end of every account-
ing year. Banks are also required to prepare certain monthly and quarterly
reports.
32
Banks must present their financial statements on a consolidated basis.33
Annual financial statements are to be completed in accordance with a
format developed by the Comite de la Reglementation Bancaire. While
regular returns to the Commission Bancaire are not routinely made avail-
able to the public, the Commission Bancaire has the right to disclose any
information which is considered to be in the public interest.
34
Auditors have a special position within the bank supervisory process. 3
Auditors are appointed from a special list and have a duty to certify that
financial statements fairly portray the condition of the banking institution
and are prepared in accordance with accounting standards set by the Comite
de la Reglementation Bancaire. The number of auditors to be selected
depends on the size of the bank. The selected auditors are required to
countersign the annual accounts of a bank before they are submitted to the
Commission Bancaire.36
B. REGULATIONS AND RATIOS
1. Loans to Single Borrowers
A first basic rule is that loans to a single borrower may not exceed 75
percent of a bank's capital.37 However, this rule does not apply when such
30. Interview, senior officials of the Commission Bancaire and the CCB, Paris, Feb. 8, 1984
(notes on file with author).
31. WELCH, France, supra note 2, at 63.
32. Id.
33. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 34.
34. Id.
35. WELCH, France, supra note 2, at 63. The duties of auditors are set forth in detail in the
French Company Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art. 218-35. See also the related Decree of
Application, Mar. 23, 1967 and the Law of Dec. 30, 1981.
36. WELCH, France, supra note 2, at 63; Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7,
at 33.
37. The rules on loan concentration are set forth in Decree No. 70-561 of July 5, 1979 and in
General Decision No. 79-07 of the Conseil National du Credit, July 6, 1979; R. DALE, THE
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loans constitute 5 percent or less of the bank's total loans and represent 50
percent or less of the borrower's total bank debts. A second basic rule is that
the sum of all large loans which amount to over 25 percent of a bank's capital
cannot be more than ten times the amount of capital. 3 8 Loans that are
guaranteed by other financial intermediaries, the central government or
certain public and semi-public bodies are deducted from the total in com-
pliance calculations.39
Supervision of loans to single borrowers extends beyond the ratios de-
scribed above. A Central Risks Service, which collects and distributes
information on banking risks and credits for use by individual banks, is
operated by the Banque de France. Loans to a single borrower in excess of
specified amounts must be reported to the Central Risks Service. 4 11
2. Capital Adequacy
Although the capital adequacy of French banks has received considerable
regulatory attention over the past few years, French banks remain under-
capitalized by international standards. Art. 51 of the French Banking Act
now provides a statutory basis for the establishment of required ratios on
capital adequacy and liquidity by the Comite de la Reglementation
Bancaire. 4 1 Even before the enactment of the French Banking Act, regula-
tions issued in July 1979 required French banks to improve capital to risk
asset ratios with the objective of achieving minimum capital ratios of 5
percent. 42 Capital is defined to include paid-up capital, certain reserves,
retained earnings and subordinated debt less the sum of accumulated earn-
ings and intangible assets.4 3
For purposes of computing adherence to required solvency ratios, assets
are accorded different weightings depending on their perceived riskiness.
Advances representing ordinary risks are accorded a weighting of 100
percent. Less risky advances, such as interbank loans, receive a weighting of
5 percent and advances with no perceived risk, including loans to or guaran-
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING at 107 (1984) [hereinafter cited as DALE, IN-
TERNATIONAL BANKING].
38. Id.; Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 31.
39. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 31.
40. Id. at 27-28. Currently, loans above FF500,000 must be reported to the Central Risks
Service.
41. French Banking Act, supra note 2, at art. 51.
42. Capital adequacy regulations were set forth in Decree No. 79-561 of July 5, 1979, as
implemented by Instruction No. 79-02A issued by the CCB on Aug. 3, 1979. The solvency ratio
(rapport de couverture des risques) is determined by calculating the ratio of capital to certain
risk items. Risk items are comprised of various categories of advances, with appropriate
adjustment for guarantees given and received.
43. Bank Supervision in the Group ofTen, supra note 7, at 29. Banks were permitted to issue
subordinated debt pursuant to Law No. 78-741 of July 13. 1978.
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teed by the French government are given a zero weighting. If French
supervisory authorities determine that solvency is adequately regulated in a
foreign bank's home country, branches of foreign banks will not be required
to meet French solvency requirements as long as the parent bank guarantees
their obligations.
44
In October of 1984, the French government announced a new system that
will allow banks to increase loans in accordance with improvements in their
capital positions. The new system was introduced as part of the govern-
ment's general plan to encourage French banks to improve their capital
ratios.45 The Bank of France tightened capital adequacy rules in the summer
of 1985 and required banks to strive for minimum capital ratios of five
percent.46
Bank supervisory authorities have also accepted a number of new capital
raising methods. In 1984, Societe Generale issued the first non-voting
preference shares (certificats d'investissement). Subsequently. Societe
Generale was also given permission to issue permanent subordinated
debt.47
3. Liquidity
Two separate ratios govern the liquidity positions of banks. The so-called
"liquidity ratio" (rapport de liquidite) relates liquid assets to very short-
term liabilities. As defined by decree, liquid assets comprise such items as
immediately marketable assets, claims on other financial intermediaries
maturing within three months, credits to customers eligible for rediscount-
ing by the Banque de France, and certain readily marketable securities.
Liabilities at sight or due within three months are the short-term liabilities
against which liquid assets must be held. The required ratio states that banks
must at all times hold liquid and realizable assets equal to at least 60 percent
of short-term liabilities.48
A separate required ratio, a coefficient of medium to long-term opera-
44. DALE. INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 37, at 105.
45. Marsh, French Banks Give Cautious Welcome to Easier Loan Rules, Fin. Times, Oct. 30,
1984. at 1.
46. Marsh, Moving into Fresh Orbits, Fin. Times, Nov. 6, 1985, French Banking Survey,
at 13.
47. Marsh, Competition Moves Stepped Up, Fin. Times, June 26, 1985, at 4. Societe
Generale has been the leader in innovative financing techniques and by the end of 1985 it had
16% of its capital held by private shareholders as a result of nonvoting preference share
warrants attached to debt. Marsh. supra note 46, at 13.
48. The liquidity ratio was set forth in the CCB's Instruction No. 77-02.-A of Dec. 16, 1977.
The French Banking Act gives the Comite de la Reglementation Bancaire authority to approve
various balance sheet ratios to insure adequate liquidity of commercial banks. To date, the
Comite de la Reglementation Bancaire has simply continued to use the ratios initially set forth
by the CCB.
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tions (coefficient d'operation a moyen et long terme), applies to all commer-
cial banks and limits their medium and long-term liabilities to less than three
times the bank's savings deposits and capital.4 9 If this standard cannot be
met, then an alternative liquidity standard is applicable. It specifies that 80
percent of medium and long-term loans must be covered by capital plus
savings accounts and interbank borrowings having at least two years remain-
501ing to maturity.
4. Foreign Exchange Exposure
The Banque de France attempts to exercise strict control over foreign
currency exposure of French banks. Only banks which are authorized to do
so by the Banque de France may engage in foreign exchange activities and
banks generally are prohibited from increasing net foreign currency expo-
sure beyond levels they maintained in 1968. 5' While French banks are
prohibited from taking open positions against the French franc, they are
permitted to take positions in one foreign currency against another. 5 2
However, such exposure would still be monitored closely by the Banque de
France which may intervene if it considers the exchange risks taken by a
particular bank to be excessive.
C. SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING
1. Country Risk and Provisions
for Loan Losses
Traditionally, country risk analysis has been the responsibility of each
individual bank. Recently, the Banque de France has instituted consoli-
dated reporting requirements for foreign lending. The Banque de France
has agreed to provide certain data on foreign lending derived from such
consolidated reports to the BIS.54 Each quarter, banks are required to
report to the Commission Bancaire their total country risk exposure based
on consolidated operations. No specific country limits are imposed, but the
reports are monitored to reveal trends and any exposures considered large
in relation to the bank's capital base would be the subject of comment.:
Major French banks have adopted sophisticated systems for country risk
analysis. One major bank reviews its self-imposed limits on loans to particu-
49. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 31. The ratio for medium-term
operations is set out in the CCB's Instruction No. 77-03-A of Dec. 16, 1977.
50. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 37, at 106.
51. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 32.
52. R. DALE, BANK SUPERVISION AROUND 'tE WORLD, 27-28 (Group of Thirty, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as DALE, BANK SUPERVISION].
53. Interview, senior officials of AFB, Paris, Feb. 7, 1984 (notes on file with author).
54. Id.
55. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 32.
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Jar countries about three times a year, with a focus on about thirty countries
at each review period.56 Another major bank has in place a "continuous"
rating system encompassing evaluation of the economic and political risk
attached to lending in some seventy-five foreign countries. 7
The French Banking Act does not impose specific limits on international
lending by particular commercial banks. However, bank regulators have
other means available for limiting country risk exposure of French banks.
The supervisory authorities may require that reserves be allocated against
specific country reserve assets as part of their general authority to require
reserves against risk assets.58 Actual provisions for potential loan losses,
whether arising from a bank's domestic or international portfolio, are left to
the discretion of bank management. Typically, management will review the
loan portfolio at the end of each accounting period and make specific
provisions against any loss or doubtful items.
59
2. Lender of Last Resort
The Banque de France is clearly reluctant to accept responsibility for
acting as lender of last resort in the event of a solvency or liquidity crisis. 6
Especially with respect to branches and subsidiaries of French banks operat-
ing abroad, it has been hesitant to state its position on lender of last resort
matters precisely. 6' French commercial banks view the support of such
branches and subsidiaries as the responsibility of each individual bank. 62 Of
course, because the French system of monetary control dictates that banks
have automatic and unlimited access to official credit through the sale of
eligible commercial paper to the Banque de France, the lender of last resort
function and the normal functioning of the credit markets are sometimes
difficult to distinguish.63
Among major French banks, the prevailing view is that the Banque de
France would act as a lender of last resort only in a national crisis evidenced
by major economic or political difficulties. 64 Under most foreseeable cir-
cumstances, art. 52 of the French Banking Act provides the applicable
56. Interview, senior official of major French bank, Paris, Feb. 9, 1984 (notes on file with
author).
57. Id.
58. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 32.
59. C. Johnson, France, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 2, at 92.
60. Interview, senior official of major French bank, Paris, Feb. 10, 1984 (notes on file with
author).
61. Interview, senior official of AFB, Paris, Feb. 7, 1984 (notes on file with author).
62. Interview, senior official of major French bank, Paris, Feb. 10, 1984 (notes on file with
author).
63. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 37, at 146.
64. Interviews, senior officials of major French banks, Paris, Feb. 9, 1984 and May 30, 1985
(notes on file with author).
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guidelines. Art. 52 enables the Governor of the Banque de France to call on
shareholders to provide additional financial backing or to call on industry-
wide contributions to preserve the French banking system and the interests
of depositors.65
The AFB's deposit insurance scheme would also become operative in the
event of a true solvency or liquidity crisis. The AFB's plan is operative only
within the geographic limits of France. Therefore, it includes branches and
subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in France and excludes foreign
branches of French banks. Because there is no fund, direct contributions
from AFB members would be required in the event of an actual crisis.66
3. Treatment of Branches and Subsidiaries
of French Banks Operating Abroad
French banks have always been quite centralized and most decisions with
respect to international lending are made at the respective head offices in
Paris. Large commercial banks are required by the Comite de la Regle-
mentation Bancaire to prepare consolidated financial statements. 67 The
inclusion of subsidiaries in the calculation of solvency ratios is a further
indication of banks' responsibilities for their global operations.68
Reporting requirements underscore the fact that branches and sub-
sidiaries abroad are the responsibility of the Paris headquarters or parent, as
the case may be. 69 Each year, every French bank is required to provide the
Commission Bancaire with a full list of all its branches and subsidiaries, both
inside and outside France. An approved bank with its head office in France
does not require the usual prior authorization of the Conseil National du
Credit before it can establish a branch abroad. Such branches would,
however, be subject to any exchange control restrictions under which au-
thorization is required for investments abroad by French citizens.7°
4. Treatment of Foreign
Banks in France
It is generally true that there is no distinction made between the supervi-
sion of foreign-owned and domestic banks. 71 Upon approval of an applica-
tion by the Comite des Etablissements de Credit, a foreign bank may open
either a subsidiary or a branch in France.72 Pursuant to the French Banking
65. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 37, at 146.
66. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 37, at 146; Mecanisme de solidarite de la
profession; regles adoptees par l'Association Francaise des Banques, AFB, 1981.
67. C. Johnson, France, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 2, at 91.
68. Interview, senior officials of AFB, Feb. 7, 1984 (notes on file with author).
69. Interview, senior official of major French bank, Feb. 10, 1984 (notes on file with author).
70. WELCH, France, supra note 2, at 68.
71. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 25.
72. C. Johnson, France, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 2, at 87.
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Act, branches of foreign banks are expected to maintain capital equal to at
least the minimum required of a similar banking institution organized under
French law. 73 Branches of foreign banks are required to have independent
accounting systems and must independently satisfy the preconditions for
qualification and registration as banking institutions in France. 74
While there is no general official distinction between foreign-owned and
domestic banks, it is sometimes acknowledged that foreign-owned banks
have faced additional requirements that they participate in the bailout of
failing French companies. Once the 1985 financial reform package had been
adopted, however, there seemed to be greater practical application of the
long-stated official position that foreign-owned and domestic banks were to
receive equal treatment. 75
Reporting requirements imposed on domestic banks are generally appli-
cable to foreign banks, with appropriate modifications. For example, for-
eign banks are required to maintain in one of their offices in France a
complete record of all transactions carried out on French territory. More-
over, under the requirements for publication of balance sheets, a foreign
bank's branch must arrange for the publication both of the balance sheet of
its own operations in France and of the balance sheet of the banking
institution and consolidated subsidiaries as a whole (in the currency of its
country of origin). 76 Pursuant to art. 49 of the French Banking Law, reci-
procity agreements may form the basis of transfer of information about




Yves Laulan, formerly group economic adviser for Societe Generale, has
published his proposal for a new approach towards cooperation on interna-
tional indebtedness.78 Laulan argues that enhanced roles for the IMF and
World Bank and somewhat greater cooperation between domestic supervi-
sory authorities would be desirable and could be used to encourage con-
tinued lending by French banks.
In Laulan's view, servicing existing debt is not the main problem, which is
rather finding ways to maintain the flow of capital to developing nations. To
encourage banks to continue lending, the IMF and World Bank should
73. Id. at 88; French Banking Act, supra note 2, at art. 16(3).
74. Id.
75. Wallace, supra note 1.
76. WELCH, France, supra note 2, at 79.
77. French Banking Act, supra note 2, at art. 49; Riggs, supra note 3, at 27.
78. Laulan, A New Approach to International Indebtedness, THE BANKER, at 25-30 (June
1983).
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undertake some additional functions. Banks should provide systematic
information about their plans to make loans to LDCs to the IMF with
respect to general loans and to the World Bank with respect to project
financing. In return for this prior information, loans extended by a bank
would be given some kind of guarantee. Laulan argues that banks must have
more confidence if they are to continue to engage in an adequate amount of
international lending. They must be certain that part of the risk of additional
LDC lending will be borne by an international insurance or guarantee
system, comprised, perhaps, of a network of international institutions.79
While they generally share Laulan's view that continued foreign lending
by French banks should be encouraged, French commercial bankers often
emphasize that lending must be focused so as to support French exports.
Many French commercial bankers condition their support for greater inter-
national cooperation through the World Bank and the IMF on an allowance
for the development of independent national programs to support trade and
export goals. While they expressed reservations about some aspects of the
Baker debt proposal (the Baker Plan) (see page 210), French commercial
banks issued a generally favorable reply to the proposal to increase commer-
cial lending to LDCs by $20 billion over three years. Specifically, French
commercial bankers stated that United States commercial banks should
accept a larger share of the new lending burden than contemplated by the
Baker Plan. 80
II. Bank Regulation and Supervision in Belgium
A. GENERALLY
The extensive potential powers of the Commission Bancaire [hereinafter
referred to as the Belgian Commission Bancaire to distinguish it from the
French bank regulatory entity having the same name], tempered in practice
by its cautious supervisory approach, are hallmarks of the Belgian bank
regulatory and supervisory structure. There are only a few specific rules on
matters such as capital adequacy and loans to single borrowers which must
be precisely followed by Belgian commercial banks. Belgian banks conduct
their business in an environment relatively free from strict rules and guide-
lines. Commercial banks in Belgium form a small, cohesive group and they
take pride in the strong consultative elements of their bank regulatory
system. Belgian banks are only moderately involved in lending to LDCs and
this has facilitated a consensus on such matters as appropriate levels of
country risk for individual banks.
79. Id. at 28.
80. Banks in France Respond Positively to Debt Initiative, Fin. Times, Dec. 17, 1985, at 4.
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1. The Belgian Banking Act
The governing statute for commercial banking activity in Belgium is the
Banking Law (Royal Decree No. 185 of 1935) which was extensively revised
in 1975 pursuant to the so-called "Mammouth Act" (]a Loi Mammouth) and
amended again in 1980 (as so amended, the Belgian Banking Act). 8 '
2. The Belgian Commission Bancaire and
the Banque Nationale de Belgique
The Belgian Commission Bancaire is the primary bank supervisory au-
thority in Belgium and is charged generally with supervising and regulating
the banking system. 82 The Belgian Commission Bancaire is comprised of
seven members, including a president appointed by the King. Two of the
members must be chosen from a list submitted by the Belgian Bankers'
Association and the Association of Private Savings Banks, and two must be
selected from a list submitted by the Banque Nationale de Belgique and the
Institute of Rediscount and Guarantee (Institut de Reescompte et de
Garantie) (the IRG), another monetary institution.83
In contrast to the strong government influence on the French Commission
Bancaire, the Belgian Commission Bancaire enjoys great autonomy. As one
Belgian legal scholar has observed,
The Commission's autonomy from the Belgian government is in reality close to
independence. This independence was sought by the authors of Royal Decree No.
185 in 1935, a time when regulatory bodies in the financial field were just being
created and were therefore regarded suspiciously. It was a way to establish an
agency that in theory would not be influenced by political trends and governments.
would have a technical approach and would be outside the power of the Ministry of
the Treasury.
84
Moreover, "except for a limited number of cases specified by law, the
[Belgian Commission Bancaire] acts and decides independently, and bears
81. Arrete Royal No. 185, July 9, 1935, Belgian Commission Bancaire, as amended by
Decree No. 262 of Mar. 26, 1936; Decree of Oct. 22, 1937; Decree No. 67 of Nov. 30, 1939;
Laws of Oct. 6, 1944, Dec. 23, 1946, June 16, 1947, Mar. 11, 1948, Mar. 14, 1962, Apr. 2, 1962,
and May 3, 1967; Decree No. 43 of Oct. 9, 1967; and the Laws of June 30, 1975, Aug. 4, 1978
and Aug. 8, 1980 (the Belgian Banking Act). Other significant laws and implementing decrees
include the following: (a) Decree of Nov. 24, 1937, on information to be provided by banks to
the Banque Nationale de Belgique and to the Commission Bancaire; (b) Arrete Royal No. 29,
Aug. 24, 1939, relating to the activity and organization of the Banque Nationale de Belgique;
and (c) Arrete du Regent, Oct. 5, 1948, relating to the Banque Nationale de Belgique.
82. Belgian Banking Act, supra note 81, at art. 35.
83. Belgian Banking Act, supra note 81, at art. 37.
84. Bruyneel, The Belgian Commission Bancaire: Functions and Methods, J. COM. CORP.
LAW & SEC. REG. 351, 354 (Sept. 1980).
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full responsibility for its actions and decisions.",8 5 The autonomy of the
Belgian Commission Bancaire is often cited to explain its efficiency and
prestige. While its regulations and decisions may be reviewed by appeal to
the Belgian Ministry of the Treasury or to the Council of State, such appeals
have been extremely rare.
86
Regular discussions between the Belgian Commission Bancaire and the
senior officers of individual banks form the basis of the Belgian supervisory
approach. Meetings between the Belgian Commission Bancaire and man-
agement of a commercial bank typically focus on the bank's financial per-
formance, its mix of assets and liabilities and areas of particular concern,
including such matters as capital adequacy, country risk evaluation sys-
tems and items set forth in a bank's consolidated returns.8 7 Guidelines
promulgated by the Belgian Commission Bancaire are developed in close
cooperation with the Belgian Bankers' Association and commercial
banks.8 8 By statutory requirement, the members of the Belgian Commission
Bancaire and its staff are bound to high standards of professional confiden-
tiality and secrecy with respect to information concerning the general affairs
or financial condition of the banks they supervise.
8 9
Art. 12 of the Belgian Banking Act provides that every bank must submit
to the Banque Nationale de Belgique and to the Belgian Commission
Bancaire annual and monthly balance sheets, as well as an annual profit and
loss account. 90 Pursuant to art. 73 of the Mammouth Act, the annual
balance sheet and profit and loss account must be in the form prescribed by
Royal Decree No. 64 of November 10, 1967. 91
In addition to regular informal discussions with the Belgian Commission
Bancaire and examination of its financial accounts on a monthly and annual
basis, all banks operating in Belgium (including branches of foreign banks)
are subject to regular formal inspections by the Belgian Commission Ban-
caire. Ordinarily, such inspections focus on the organization, basic functions
and lending transactions of such banks. At the discretion of the Belgian
Commission Bancaire, any information that is needed to verify a bank's
compliance with various banking laws and regulations can also be required.
Under certain circumstances, the Belgian Commission Bancaire may
request that the Banque Nationale de Belgique undertake inspections on its
85. Id.
86. Id.; for more detailed information on the Commission Bancaire, see Bruyneel, La
Commission bancaire beige, BANQUE (Jan.-Mar. 1972).
87. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 5-7.
88. WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 29.
89. Belgian Banking Act, supra note 81, at art. 40.
90. Id. at art. 12.
91. Law of June 30, 1975, at art. 73.
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behalf.92 In practice, the separate assistance of the Banque Nationale de
Belgique is not often requested. Since 1975, the Belgian Commission Ban-
caire has been empowered to make inspections of banks without the assist-
ance of the Banque Nationale de Belgique and it is anticipated that, over the
long-term, the Banque Nationale de Belgique will decrease its assistance in
the inspection process.
93
The Banque Nationale de Belgique is the principal organ for the execu-
tion of monetary policy in Belgium. It is empowered to make recommenda-
tions on monetary policy to banks and other financial intermediaries.94 Such
recommendations might include the establishment of certain prescribed
ratios among balance sheet items as well as recommendations made for
monetary reasons. 9
5
3. Commercial Banks and
the Supervisory Process
Nearly all Belgian banks are members of the Association Beige des
Banques (Belgian Bankers' Association). While the Belgian Bankers' Asso-
ciation does not have a direct role in the supervision of banks for prudential
purposes, it does have a consultative function with respect to the formula-
tion of banking statutes or guidelines.96 For example, the Banque Nationale
de Belgique can only formulate recommendations on banking ratios, regula-
tions or statutes after consultation with interested financial intermediaries
or their representatives in the Belgian Bankers' Association.97 Pursuant to
the Belgian Banking Act, similar consultation requirements apply to regula-
tions made by the Belgian Commission Bancaire on solvency and liquidity
ratios and on controls over certain large loans. 98 Moreover, the Belgian
Bankers' Association enjoys a rather unique status in the development of
interbank agreements. Agreements on various banking practices and stan-
dards, which serve as substitutes for more formal regulations, must usually
be signed before a bank can be admitted to membership in the Belgian
Bankers' Association. 99
The presence of a large number of foreign banks in Belgium has in-
fluenced relations between the Belgian Commission Bancaire and commer-
cial banks generally. In 1983, for example, of a total of eighty-four banks in
92. Belgian Banking Act, supra note 81, at art. 19; WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 7-8.
93. Interview, senior official of the Banque Nationale de Belgique, Brussels, May 31, 1985.
94. Law of Dec. 28, 1973.
95. WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 18.
96. Id. at 29.
97. Banking Law of Dec. 28, 1978, at art. 1.
98. WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 29.
99. Id.
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Belgium, twenty-seven were branches of foreign banks and twenty-one
others were subsidiaries or affiliates of foreign banks."o
4. Accounting and
Disclosure Requirements
Basic requirements for the preparation of annual and interim accounts are
set forth in art. 12 of the Belgian Banking Act. Art. 12 requires that banks
prepare such reports and authorizes the Belgian Commission Bancaire to
prepare specific guidelines for the detailed preparation of these accounts. 101
Like the Swiss system of bank regulation (see discussion, infra), the
Belgian system gives significant authority to auditors. Approved bank audi-
tors (so-called "reviseurs agrees") are specially certified by and accountable
to the Belgian Commission Bancaire and perform on-site examinations of
banks. 112 Pursuant to a law enacted in 1980, the Belgian Commission
Bancaire appoints one or more of these approved bank auditors in each
bank and determines and pays their fees. "'3 Approved bank auditors are
appointed for a three-year period, which can be renewed. Because the
salaries of the approved bank auditors are paid by the Belgian Commission
Bancaire, it is empowered to remove them from office at any time. i04
Approved bank auditors verify the annual accounts and returns submitted
to the Belgian Commission Bancaire, determine in a preliminary manner a
bank's compliance with regulatory requirements, and develop comprehen-
sive internal audit control systems. They are also charged with a general
responsibility for monitoring the solvency, liquidity and profitability of a
given bank. 10 5 Approved bank auditors are usually highly qualified indi-
viduals with special professional training and expertise in issues relating to
bank accounting practices.
Each bank established under Belgian law must also appoint one or more
internal auditors (commissaires) accountable primarily to shareholders.
Internal auditors are required to be members of the Institut des Reviseurs
d'Entreprises (Institute of Corporate Accountants). 106
Both approved bank auditors and internal auditors would be expected to
prepare reports in accordance with various Belgian accounting statutes and
guidelines and must adhere to consolidated reporting requirements. In
1982, the Belgian Commission Bancaire issued a circular letter to banks
recommending that they draw up and publish annual consolidated accounts.
100. Swolfs, Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 2, at 71; The Belgian
Banking Sector in Profile, Kredietbank Weekly Bulletin, Apr. 22, 1983, at 1.
101. Belgian Banking Act, supra note 81, at art. 12.
102. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 10-11.
103. Law of Aug. 8, 1980, at art. 19 bis.
104. Id., at art. 19 bis (1).
105. Id., at art. 19 bis (2).
106. WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 7.
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Specific requirements were not imposed, but banks and their auditors from
that time on were expected to follow generally accepted auditing standards
in presenting a "true and fair" view of a bank's consolidated condition. 
7
B. REGULATIONS AND RATIOS
1. Loans to Single Borrowers
Disclosure requirements and general solvency ratios, but not strict limits,
apply to loans to single borrowers. The Belgian Banking Act gives the
Belgian Commission Bancaire power to issue regulations establishing the
ratios to be maintained between other balance sheet data, own capital and
the total of assets, claims and contingent claims on a single enterprise or on a
group of affiliated enterprises which, in practice, form a single risk. '0 8 Banks
must report on a monthly basis to the Belgian Commission Bancaire all
credits granted which individually exceed 20 percent of a bank's own capital.
Such loans in excess of 20 percent of a bank's capital would also require
additional capital backing. 109 Credits to separate but connected borrowers
are aggregated for purposes of the monthly reports.' ' Moreover, the Bel-
gian Commission Bancaire has generally recommended that loan concentra-
tions to single borrowers be reduced when they are in excess of 50 percent of
the bank's capital."'
Notice requirements apply to large loans in excess of one million Belgian
francs. The Service Centrale des Risques of the Banque Nationale de
Belgique (Belgian Central Risks Service) was set up in 1965 for the purpose
of monitoring such credits." 2 Reports of large loans, which are also made
available to the Belgian Commission Bancaire, are filed monthly by com-
mercial banks and Belgian branches of foreign banks. The information
collected by the Belgian Central Risks Service may be shared with foreign
bank supervisory authorities. 113
2. Capital Adequacy
Art. 11 of the Belgian Banking Act gives the Belgian Commission
Bancaire power to regulate capital adequacy ratios and liquidity ratios." 4
107. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 11.
108. WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 17; this authority is provided by the Mammouth Law
of June 30, 1975.
109. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 37, at 101.
110. WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 6.
111. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 9; DALE, INTERNATIONAL
BANKING, supra note 37, at 101.
112. The decree of Oct. 9, 1967 expanded the powers of the Central Risks Service; WELCH,
Belgium, supra note 2, at 21-22.
113. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 9; Belgian Banking Act, supra
note 81, at art. 12.
114. Belgian Banking Act, supra note 81, at art. 11.
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The Belgian Commission Bancaire is authorized to issue solvency and
liquidity regulations after consulting with the Banque Nationale de Belgique
and obtaining the approval of the Minister for Finance and Economic
Affairs. 115 To date, capital adequacy, but not liquidity, is subject to formal
prudential requirements. 11
6
The Belgian Commission Bancaire currently applies two capital adequacy
ratios for supervisory purposes, the "risk assets" ratio and the "fixed assets"
ratio. In theory, compliance with each of these ratios is determined on a
consolidated basis." 17 In practice, this is not yet always the case because
many Belgian commercial banks are apparently still discussing the appropri-
ate form of consolidation with the Belgian Commission Bancaire. 1 t8 Capital
is defined as the sum of equity capital, reserves, unallocated provisions for
losses (if such amounts are reported on a bank's balance sheet or notes to its
balance sheet), and retained earnings. 1 9 Subordinated debt may also be
included up to a limit of 50 percent of total capital.12
0
The "risk assets" ratio is calculated in accordance with a complex formula
which requires relatively higher capital coverage for small banks than for
large banks as well as higher capital coverage for greater concentrations of
risk among a small number of borrowers than for a large number.' 21 The
"fixed assets" ratio stipulates that a bank's holdings of fixed assets should
not exceed its capital and revenues.1
22
3. Liquidity
No specific regulations for liquidity have been issued by the Belgian
Commission Bancaire, although that regulatory body possesses the re-
quisite authority to issue them. Banks' liquidity positions are monitored by
the Belgian Commission Bancaire through analysis of monthly statistical
returns and regular reports of auditors.' 23 Monthly statistical returns in-
clude the computation of two liquidity ratios: (a) a special liquidity ratio, for
which only assets and liabilities denominated in Belgian francs are taken
into account and (b) a general liquidity ratio calculated separately for assets
and liabilities denominated in Belgian francs and in foreign currencies and
115. WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 26.
116. Commission Bancaire, Regulation of June 13, 1972; confirmed by Ministerial Decree,
Aug. 7, 1972.
117. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 8.
118. Interview, senior officials of major Belgian commercial bank, Brussels, May 31, 1985.
119. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 37, at 100.
120. Id.
121. Regulation of Commission Bancaire issued June 13, 1972, confirmed by Ministerial
Decree of Aug. 7, 1982; WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 16.
122. WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 16.
123. Id.
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for total assets and liabilities. 124 There is also a general survey every six
months to insure that all banks are sufficiently liquid.' 2
5
4. Foreign Exchange Exposure
Banks must be authorized to engage in foreign exchange transactions by
the Institut Belgo-Luxembourgeois du Change (IBLC) before they can
operate in the official foreign exchange market. The Belgian Commission
Bancaire has the power to fix statutory limits on exchange transactions, but
it has not done so.126 However, the Belgian Commission Bancaire's sol-
vency regulation of June 13, 1972, requires that each bank maintain capital
equal to 0.2 percent of the total of claims on Belgian and foreign currency
arising from forward foreign exchange transactions on both the official and
free markets. 127 In practice, approved bank auditors and internal auditors
are expected to make certain that each bank maintains adequate controls on
foreign exchange dealers and their confirmation systems.128
C. SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING
1. Country Risk and Provisions
for Loan Losses
Country risk evaluation systems have been a recent focus of attention by
the Belgian Commission Bancaire. In March of 1984, the Belgian Commis-
sion Bancaire initiated a new system of detailed reporting on country risk
exposure. 129 Details of a bank's international lending must be categorized
by country, type and maturity.' 30 The new system requires that off-balance
sheet risks, unutilized loan commitments, forward exchange transactions
and assets and liabilities held in local currencies be reported. Reports on
such items must be prepared on a consolidated basis and submitted
quarterly.' 3' Country risk information is treated on a confidential basis,
although the Belgian Commission Bancaire publishes aggregate statistics in
its annual report. 132
Actually, a country risk evaluation system has been in place since 1980,
when approved bank auditors were first required to report on each bank's
internal country risk evaluation process. Using classifications of "substan-
dard," "doubtful" and "loss," auditors report all problem loans. Provisions
124. Swolfs, Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 2, at 77-78.
125. WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 16.
126. Id., at 19-20.
127. Commission Bancaire, solvency regulation of June 13, 1972.
128. WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 21.
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and write-offs related to country risk must be included in the auditor's
report. 133 As a general rule, the Belgian Commission Bancaire requires that
loans to countries outside the EEC's "preferential zone" not exceed 50
percent of the lending bank's capital. 1
34
Hidden reserves are not addressed by the Belgian Banking Act. How-
ever, hidden reserves are utilized in practice. Banks often establish extra
loan loss reserves without disclosing them in the accounts presented to the
public.' 35 There are no specific requirements for reserves for potential loan
losses on international loans. 1
36
2. Lender of Last Resort
Liquidity support for banks in Belgium would presumably be provided by
the Banque Nationale de Belgique in the event of crisis. In addition, the
IRG, a public body which is jointly administered by representatives of
commercial banks and the government, has the power to provide liquidity
support to commercial banks. 137 The IRG enjoys broad discretion in fulfill-
ing both deposit protection and liquidity functions. The IRG's reserves
consist of one billion Belgian francs in equity capital, which is raised through
subscriptions from commercial banks, money market borrowings, and bor-
rowings from the Banque Nationale de Belgique. 138 The IRG has the
authority but not the obligation to pay off creditors of failed institutions. It
also has the authority to provide liquidity assistance if it should deem such
assistance to be in the public interest. 139
It is difficult to predict what the response of the Banque Nationale de
Belgique or IRG would be in the event of a true solvency crisis. Indeed,
several Belgian commercial bankers and central bank officials have stated
that while Belgian authorities would certainly look to the Basle Concordat
for guidance, it would be difficult to predict the precise response of the
Banque Nationale de Belgique or the IRG to a widespread solvency
crisis. 140
133. Id.
134. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 37, at 101.
135. Swolfs, Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 2, at 75.
136. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 37, at 101.
137. WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 22. The IRG was established by Royal Decree No.
175 of June 13, 1935.
138. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 37, at 144.
139. Id.
140. Interviews, senior officials of Banque Nationale de Belgique, Brussels, Jan. 31, 1984
and May 31, 1985; interview with senior officials of a major Belgian commercial bank, Brussels,
Feb. 1, 1984 and May 31, 1985 (notes on file with author).
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3. Treatment of Branches and Subsidiaries
of Belgian Banks Operating Abroad
There are no special requirements applicable to foreign branches and
subsidiaries of Belgian banks. However, Belgian banks are expected to
notify the Belgian Commission Bancaire prior to the establishment of a
foreign branch. 14 1 Moreover, because of consolidated reporting require-
ments, the balance sheets of a Belgian bank's branches in another country
would be included in the bank's global figures for solvency ratio purposes. 1
42
4. Treatment of Foreign
Banks in Belgium
Belgian branches of foreign banks must file with the Belgian Commission
Bancaire. Supervisory controls applicable to Belgian banks generally, in-
cluding rules for the preparation of annual and interim accounts, apply to
foreign bank branches and subsidiaries operating in Belgium. 143 Pursuant to
art. 6 of the Belgian Banking Act, foreign banks which maintain one or more
branch offices in Belgium are required to maintain a separate balance sheet
for their Belgian operations. 144 Capital adequacy requirements are, how-
ever, different for branches of foreign banks.
145
Pursuant to art. 40 of the Belgian Banking Act, the Belgian Commission
Bancaire is entitled to provide to foreign bank supervisory authorities
information that it has received from branches or subsidiaries of foreign
banks. 146 Reflecting the rather exceptional willingness of Belgian author-
ities to cooperate with bank supervisory agencies in other countries, the
initiative for the exchange of information can come either from the Belgian
Commission Bancaire or from the foreign bank supervisory authority.147
5. Attitudes towards
International Cooperation
In assessing Belgian attitudes towards international cooperation, it is
important to remember that only three or four of the largest Belgian
commercial banks are actively engaged in international lending to LDCs.
Moreover, the lending done by Belgian banks has been very diversified
geographically. This has resulted in a reasonable and limited exposure to
LDC debt. 148
141. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 7.
142. WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 12.
143. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 7.
144. Belgian Banking Act, supra note 81, at art. 6.
145. Swolfs, Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 2, at 72.
146. Belgian Banking Act, supra note 81, at art. 40 (as amended by the law of June 30, 1975).
147. WELCH, Belgium, supra note 2, at 25.
148. Interview, senior official of Commission Bancaire, Brussels, Jan. 30, 1984 (notes on file
with author).
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The Belgian Commission Bancaire views the Basle Concordat as the most
important source of guidance among countries in establishing regulatory or
supervisory policies to deal with international lending. The Belgian Com-
mission Bancaire has also taken a leading role in promoting the exchange of
information among domestic bank supervisors that has always been encour-
aged by the Cooke Committee. 149 Belgian bankers and supervisors are
in agreement that crisis solutions, such as an international debt discount
agency, would only transform a problem that appears to be solvable by
present measures into a much more serious intergovernmental problem. 1 50
III. Bank Regulation and Supervision
in the Netherlands
A. GENERALLY
The bank regulatory and supervisory system in the Netherlands places
both central bank functions and primary supervisory responsibility in the
Nederlandsche Bank. The system is complex and rule-oriented, and relies
on comprehensive guidelines for solvency and liquidity. The extensive rules
are similar to those of the United States or West German supervisory
systems, but the pattern of frequent informal communications between the
Nederlandsche Bank and commercial banks is reminiscent of the consulta-
tive dimensions of the United Kingdom system.
In late November 1985, the Dutch government announced a series of
measures to deregulate Dutch capital markets. The measures were aimed at
increasing competitiveness with the United Kingdom and the Federal Re-
public of Germany. As announced by Mr. H. Onno Ruding, the Finance
Minister, the measures included permission to use such innovative instru-
ments as floating rate notes, certificates of deposit and commercial paper
and were expected to increase competition from foreign banks because
foreign banks would be permitted for the first time to lead manage issuing
syndicates for guilder bonds and to underwrite up to one-third of a bond
issue. 151
1. The Dutch Banking Act
The Act on the Supervision of the Credit System (the Dutch Banking Act)
became effective on January 1, 1979. 152 It reflects a comprehensive revision
149. Id.
150. Interview, senior officials of Banque Nationale de Belgique, Jan. 31, 1984 and May 31,
1985 (notes on file with author); interview with senior officials of a major Belgian commercial
bank, Brussels, Feb. 1, 1984, and May 31, 1985 (notes on file with author).
151. Rain, Dutch Plan Sweeping Changes to Deregulate Capital Markets, Fin. Times,
November 21, 1985, at 1.
152. De Nederlandsche Bank, N.V. The Revised Act on the Supervision of the Credit System,
March 1979 [hereinafter cited as the Dutch Banking Act]. By Royal Decree of Dec. 21, 1978,
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of prior statutes and much parliamentary discussion. The Dutch Banking
Act was originally submitted to the Dutch Parliament in 1970. Subse-
quently, its consideration was delayed, due to changes of government, the
desire to make the law correspond to EEC proposals on harmonization of
banking laws and a general tightening up of attitudes towards prudential
controls. A revised version was submitted to the Dutch Parliament in July
1975 and was approved by Parliament on April 11, 1978.153
2. The Nederlandsche Bank
The Nederlandsche Bank is responsible for enforcing the Dutch Banking
Act and for the general supervision and regulation of Dutch banks. The
Nederlandsche Bank was founded in 1814 and nationalized by the Bank Act
of 1948 (the Nederlandsche Bank Act), which is its charter.154 It is con-
trolled by a Board of Commissaries (supervisory board) which has twelve
members appointed by the Dutch government. The Board of Commissaries
is responsible for supervising the management of the Nederlandsche Bank
and for oversight of its annual balance sheet and profit and loss account. A
Governing Board, consisting of between five and seven members appointed
by the Crown, is responsbile for the day-to-day administration of the Neder-
landsche Bank. 55 The Dutch government exercises further control over the
Nederlandsche Bank through the appointment of a Royal Commissioner,
"who is responsible for supervising the Nederlandsche Bank's actions on
behalf of the Government."'
' 56
Art. 9 of the Nederlandsche Bank Act states that one of the functions of
the Nederlandsche Bank is "to supervise credit operations on the basis of
the provisions of the (Dutch Banking Act).' 57 Sec. 18 of the Dutch Bank-
ing Act grants the Nederlandsche Bank "power to seek or have sought on its
behalf from any credit institution any information which it considers mate-
rial to the proper performance of the tasks imposed on it by (the Dutch
Banking Act)."' 58 Subject to limited exceptions, any information regarding
the date of entry into force of the Dutch Banking Act, which had been published in the
Staatsblad on Apr. 13, 1978, was fixed at Jan. 1, 1979. The revised Dutch Banking Act
supersedes the original Act on the Supervision of the Credit System of Jan. 18, 1952 which had
been altered in some minor respects in 1956.
153. Id.
154. WELCH, The Netherlands, supra note 2, at 201.
155. Id.; there is also a Bank Council, which is charged with advising the Nederlandsche
Bank and the Minister of Finance on policy matters.
156. Id.
157. Nederlandsche Bank Act, at art. 9. An English translation is available from Nederland-
sche Bank. The Dutch language version is set forth at Staatsblad voor het Koninkrijk der
Nederlanden, and in Nederlandse Staatswetten, editie Schuurman & Jordens.
158. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at sec. 18(1). An English translation is available
from Nederlandsche Bank. The Dutch language version is set forth at Staatsblad voor het
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, and in Nederlandse Staatswetten, editie Schuurman & Jordens.
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individual banks obtained pursuant to sec. 18 is granted confidential
treatment.159 One important result of sec. 18 is that the Nederlandsche
Bank has full power to instruct Dutch commercial banks to verify statistical
and other returns submitted to it. 1
60
The primary powers of the Nederlandsche Bank relate to the examination
of detailed returns submitted by Dutch commercial banks. Pursuant to sec.
11 of the Dutch Banking Act, each commercial bank must submit its
accounts to the Nederlandsche Bank, on an annual basis, within six months
of the end of the fiscal year. The required information includes the balance
sheet and the profit and loss account accompanied by an explanatory
report. 161 These annual accounts must be certified by a registered accoun-
tant or other certified expert. 1
62
In addition, each bank is required to submit a monthly return, in balance
sheet form. Like the annual returns, monthly returns are used both for
supervisory purposes with respect to each bank, and for aggregation with
national statistics on the Dutch banking industry. 163 The monthly returns
are also used for monetary supervision. 1
64
The bank regulations administered by the Nederlandsche Bank are tech-
nical and complicated, particularly with respect to matters such as capital
adequacy and liquidity. However, Dutch commercial bankers emphasize
that frequent informal contracts between the central bank and senior man-
agement of commercial banks overcome potential problems of overly rigid
statutory interpretation. 165
3. Commercial Banks and
the Supervisory Process
Membership in the Dutch Bankers' Association (Nederlandsche Bank-
iersvereniging) is open to all Dutch banks and branches of foreign banks. Its
stated purpose is to provide a link between its members and the Nederland-
sche Bank. The basis for the consultative function of the Dutch Bankers'
159. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at sec. 18(2). Section 46(2) provides a limited
exception to the confidentiality provisions of sec. 18(2). It provides that the Nederlandsche
Bank is to have power to exchange data or information relating to the solvency and liquidity of
credit institutions with foreign agencies charged with the supervision of credit institutions in
their own country, provided that these agencies are bound to keep the data or information
received secret.
160. WELCH, The Netherlands, supra note 2, at 204.
161. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at sec. 11(1).
162. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at sec. 11(3).
163. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at sec. 19(1); WELCH, The Netherlands, supra note
2, at 203.
164. Van der Beek and Ruijter, The Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING,
supra note 2, at 166.
165. Interview, senior officials of major Dutch commercial bank, Amsterdam, Feb. 3, 1984
and June 3, 1985 (notes on file with author).
VOL. 20. NO. I
INTERNATIONAL BANK LENDING: PART II 181
Association is set forth in secs. 21 and 22 of the Dutch Banking Act. 166 Any
changes in regulations or laws affecting commercial banks must first be
discussed with the Dutch Bankers' Association. 1
67
Consultation also takes place directly and informally between the Neder-
landsche Bank and top management of commercial banks. As a Dutch
banker noted, "the Dutch Bankers' Association is quite useful, but we don't
need to go through it to get our message across to the Nederlandsche
Bank.",1 68 Other bankers emphasize the "small banking community with
significant informal communication between the central bank and commer-
cial banks." 169 However, the consultative aspects of the Dutch bank super-
visory system should not be overemphasized. There are specialized rules





The Dutch supervisory system emphasizes disclosure and accounting
requirements. In accordance with sec. 11 of the Dutch Banking Act, the
Nederlandsche Bank has issued the Model Annual Accounts for Credit
Institutions. Such model annual accounts contain instructions and guide-
lines which must be followed by commercial banks. 171 Sec. 11 of the Dutch
Banking Act provides that a reporting bank must supply the Nederlandsche
Bank with all information which it requests and which may reasonably be
deemed necessary to carry out its duties. 172 The Nederlandsche Bank is
required by statute to give the reporting bank the opportunity to be present
when the external registered accountant furnishes information. 173
Reporting is done on a fully consolidated basis. Dutch bankers typically
distinguish Dutch consolidation principles from those of the United King-
dom or the Federal Republic of Germany. British and West German con-
166. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at secs. 21(2), 22(1).
167. Id.
168. Interview, senior official of major Dutch commercial bank, Amsterdam, Feb. 3, 1984
(notes on file with author). Communication between commercial banks and supervisors is
facilitated by the small number of major Dutch banks engaged in significant amounts of
international lending. Such banks include Algemene Bank Nederland, Amsterdam-Rotterdam
Bank and Rabobank.
169. Interview, senior official of major Dutch commercial bank, Amsterdam, Feb. 6, 1984
(notes on file with author).
170. Interview with senior officials of Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, June 3, 1985;
interview with senior officials of major Dutch commercial bank, June 3, 1985 (notes on file with
author).
171. Van der Beek and Ruijter, The Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING,
supra note 2, at 169. The Model Annual Accounts for Credit Institutions are set forth at 176-79.
172. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at sec. 11(3).
173. Id.
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solidation principles are said to be less complete than those applied in the
Netherlands.' 74 Dutch banks are not allowed to "net out" balances among
affiliates and subsidiaries in their consolidated reports. Balances must be
shown individually as well as collectively. 75
B. REGULATIONS AND RATIOS
1. Loans to Single Borrowers
The basic rule is that no credit institution may lend in excess of 25 percent
of its capital to any one private commercial borrower without the prior
approval of the Nederlandsche Bank. However, the limit is raised to 50
percent for claims on foreign governments, foreign credit institutions and
risk assets guaranteed by foreign banks. 176 In the case of claims on foreign
banks with share capital of 12 billion Dutch guilders or more, the upper
lending limit is 100 percent. 177 Loans guaranteed by domestic banks are
exempt from this requirement. 178
There are also related limits on large loans. Pursuant to its general
supervisory powers set forth in sec. 18 of the Dutch Banking Act, the
Nederlandsche Bank requires all banks to report monthly on the extension
of large credits of two million Dutch guilders or more, or amounting to 5
percent or more of a bank's capital. 179 In addition, the capital adequacy
requirements discussed below impose certain additional requirements for
loans to any single borrower or group of connected borrowers in excess of 15
percent of a bank's capital. The additional capital requirements range from
100 percent to 200 percent of the basic capital requirements.I
2. Capital Adequacy
The Dutch Banking Act gives the Nederlandsche Bank power to exercise
prudential controls in respect of capital adequacy and liquidity of banking
institutions. In simple terms, the solvency or capital adequacy directives
require that capital be available in proportion to the volume of a bank's
risk-bearing operations. The liquidity directives require that liquid assets be
readily available to prevent maturity mismatching.
In contrast to the old supervisory Banking Act of 1956, which provided
the Nederlandsche Bank with only a few instruments for intervention when
174. Interview, senior officials of Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, Feb. 2, 1984 (notes on
file with author).
175. Interview, senior officials of Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, Feb. 2, 1984 (notes on
file with author).
176. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 69.
177. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 37, at 120.
178. Id.
179. WELCH, The Netherlands, supra note 2, at 203.
180. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 68-69.
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a bank failed to comply with its directives or when the Nederlandsche Bank
identified developments that could endanger a banking institution's liquid-
ity or solvency, the Dutch Banking Act offers the Nederlandsche Bank the
use of a broader range of instruments, supported by the sanctions of the
Economic Offenses Act, to counter undesirable developments affecting
capital adequacy.
t81
Pursuant to sec. 24 of the Dutch Banking Act, with respect to prudential
controls, the Nederlandsche Bank may give binding instructions on the
course of action to be pursued instead of recommendations. If such instruc-
tions are not followed, the Nederlandsche Bank may (a) put the bank into
"secret receivership," (b) publish the instructions, or (c) consult with the
chairman of the Dutch Bankers' Association to determine if a financially
strong institution might be called upon for help. 1
82
In addition, sec. 46(3) of the Dutch Banking Act empowers the Neder-
landsche Bank to exchange data or information regarding capital adequacy
or prudential control generally with foreign bank supervisory authorities. In
this respect, the Netherlands and Belgium have been the first EEC member
states to erect a legal foundation for international contacts on matters
relating to bank supervision. 183
The solvency directive attempts to insure that a bank's "own funds" or
capital will be sufficient to cover the risks entailed in the conduct of its
business. To this end, assets are classified according to the degree of risk and
must be covered by capital in varying proportions between zero and 100
percent. 84 Capital is defined as paid-in capital plus published reserves,
certain types of "hidden" reserves and subordinated debt, provided that the
total amount of subordinated debt does not exceed paid-in capital and
reserves and that the maximum annual redemption does not exceed five
percent of capital and reserves. 185 In addition, two undisclosed or "hidden"
reserve items are considered capital for purposes of solvency requirements.
These are the reserve for general business risks and the reserve for deferred
taxes, both of which are contained in a broader balance sheet liability
account entitled "creditors."
Solvency ratios are applied on a pro rata consolidated basis, with respect
to all holdings exceeding 25 percent.186 A June 1983 revision changed the
181. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at sec. 24.
182. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at sec. 24(3).
183. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at sec. 46(3). This section provides in pertinent
part that "the (Nederlandsche Bank) has power to exchange data or information relating to the
solvency and liquidity of credit institutions with foreign agencies charged with the supervision
of credit institutions in their own country, provided that these agencies are bound to keep the
data or information received secret."
184. WELCH, The Netherlands, supra note 2, at 209.
185. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 68.
186. Interview, senior officials of Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, Feb. 2, 1984 and
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solvency rules to require that the risks associated with loans to foreign
governments, foreign credit institutions and "semi-public" domestic en-
tities, all of which had previously been free of any specific solvency require-
ments, be included in the calculation of solvency ratios. 18 7 At present, no
equity is required to be held against loans made to or under the guaranty of
the Dutch government. A solvency ratio of 1 percent is required against
loans to or under the guaranty of foreign governments.' 88
3. Liquidity
Liquid assets must be held in relation to certain liabilities of credit
institutions so that anticipated liabilities can be met on the due date, or on
demand, as the case may be. 189 Liabilities are differentiated on the basis of
type and maturity. Special and more stringent guidelines apply to "large
item" liabilities when such individual liabilities exceed 1 percent, 2 percent
or a total of 15 percent of total liabilities. 190
4. Foreign Exchange Exposure
There are no specific limits on a bank's open foreign exchange positions.
However, in accordance with its general authority over prudential ratios,
the Nederlandsche Bank can require that exposure be reduced if it exceeds a
level considered appropriate for normal banking activities. 191 The solvency
directive imposes a 2.5 percent capital requirement on uncovered foreign
exchange positions. All banks authorized to deal in foreign exchange must
submit to the Nederlandsche Bank monthly reports on their positions. 192
C. SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING
1. Country Risk and Provisions
for Loan Losses
Since June 30, 1981, banks have been required to submit semi-annual
consolidated country exposure reports to assist the Nederlandsche Bank in
monitoring country risk. 193 No figures on particular countries are published.
June 3, 1985 (notes on file with author); Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at
68, DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 37, at 119.
187. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 68; DALE, BANK SUPERVISION,
supra note 52, at 48.
188. Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank, N.V., Instruments of Monetary Policy in the Nether-
lands 14, June 1983.
189. De Nederlandsche Bank, N.V., Solvency and Liquidity Directives, June 1983.
190. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 69, DALE, INTERNATIONAL
BANKING, supra note 37, at 119.
191. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 69; DALE, BANK SUPERVISION,
supra note 52, at 50.
192. Id.
193. DALE, BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 52, at 49.
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Only aggregate figures for lending to particular geographic regions are
revealed. Information submitted to the Nederlandsche Bank is treated
confidentially. The central bank may request that a bank reduce exposure to
particular countries if such exposure is deemed excessive. 194 However, the
rules on loan concentration do not apply directly to country risk. Each
commercial bank is responsible for developing its own system of country risk
evaluation and the Nederlandsche Bank's role is limited to that of suggesting
changes in bank policies. 195 The Nederlandsche Bank distinguishes between
loans to countries actually experiencing payment difficulties and those only
requiring special attention. 196
Formal reporting procedures for country risk are supplemented by semi-
annual meetings between the Nederlandsche Bank and commercial banks to
discuss broad questions about country risk. These discussions encourage
banks to discuss fully the main outlines of their internally developed country
risk evaluation procedures.
Banks in the Netherlands are not required to make particular provisions
for loan losses. In practice, however, banks set aside reserves for anticipated
bad debts, in addition to special reserves for known bad debts. 197 In contrast
to banks in some other West European countries, including Switzerland,
Dutch banks use basket provisions for loan losses, i.e., a certain percentage
is set aside for each group of countries. 198 Dutch commercial bankers view
the requirements on treatment of anticipated and known bad debts as quite
flexible. 99
In addition, Dutch banks generally maintain a loss contingency reserve
fund to cover potential unforeseeable losses on indebtedness, such as large-
scale debt defaults and nationalizations. Accounting practices in the Nether-
lands require that transfers to a loss contingency reserve be made on a
consistent basis and maintained at a reasonable minimum in relation to the
risks that are intended to be covered.2U0
2. Lender of Last Resort
Art. 15 of the Nederlandsche Banking Act gives the Nederlandsche Bank
broad powers to provide liquidity assistance. However, art. 16 of that Act
194. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 71.
195. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 37, at 120.
196. Interview, senior officials of Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, June 3, 1985 (notes on
file with author).
197. WELCH, The Netherlands, supra note 2, at 210.
198. Interview, senior officials of Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, Feb. 2, 1984 (notes on
file with author).
199. Interview, senior official of major commercial bank, Amsterdam, Feb. 3, 1984 (notes
on file with author).
200. Van der Beek and Ruijter, The Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING,
supra note 2, at 170-71.
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states that "the Bank shall grant no credit or advances without security." 20 1
Commercial bankers agree with the Nederlandsche Bank that there has
never been any further guidance on what constitutes security for this
purpose. 202
The Nederlandsche Bank has expressed some hesitancy with respect to a
lender of last resort role. Under certain unspecified circumstances, it would
presumably act as a lender of last resort with respect to Dutch guilders, but
not with respect to other currencies. Moreover, a lender of last resort role
would depend, even in a domestic crisis, on the circumstances surrounding
the particular liquidity or solvency problem. 203
In practice, commercial banks do not expect the Nederlandsche Bank to
act as a lender of last resort except in the case of an international financial
crisis of great magnitude. However, despite such expectations, the Neder-
landsche Bank did provide some assistance in the relatively small-scale crisis
affecting the Slavenburg Bank.
3. Treatment of Branches and Subsidiaries
of Dutch Banks Operating Abroad
There are no specific restrictions in the Dutch Banking Act on estab-
lishing branches or subsidiaries in other countries.2 °4 In general, however,
the acquisition of an interest of 5 percent or more in any other corporate
entity requires specific prior approval.20 5 Consolidation requirements in-
sure that strong central controls will be maintained over foreign op-
206erations.
4. Treatment of Foreign Banks
in the Netherlands
With some minor additional requirements, foreign banks are subject to
the same regulatory controls that apply to domestic banks.20 7 Such regula-
tory controls apply only to the extent that such foreign banks conduct
business in the Netherlands.20 8 Pursuant to secs. 2 and 3 of the Dutch
201. Nederlandsche Bank Act, arts. 15, 16.
202. Interview, senior officials of major commercial banks, Amsterdam, Feb. 3 and 6, 1984
(notes on file with author).
203. Interview, senior officials of Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, Feb. 2, 1984 (notes on
file with author).
204. WELCH, The Netherlands, supra note 2, at 206.
205. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at sec. 25.
206. Van der Beek and Ruijter, The Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING,
supra note 2, at 170.
207. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at sec. 1(5).
208. Id. Specifically, sec. 1(5) provides that, "In respect of enterprises and institutions which
have their registered office outside the Netherlands and which are in this country engaged in the
business of a credit institution through one or more offices, branches, agencies or permanent
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Banking Act, branches of foreign banks must be licensed before they can
carry on banking business in the Netherlands. 20 9 Before obtaining a license,
a foreign bank must provide detailed information on its home country
regulatory system and on the ability of its headquarters or parent bank to
supervise operations in the Netherlands. 21
0
Sec. 27 of the Dutch Banking Act requires that branches of foreign banks
keep separate accounts with respect to their business in the Netherlands.21
Certain special requirements apply to banks which are not from member
countries of the EEC. Sec. 7(2) of the Dutch Banking Act provides that, "if
an enterprise or institution is concerned which does not have its registered
office in a Member State of the European Communities or in which such an
enterprise or institution has direct or indirect control," the Minister of
Finance may decide whether to grant or refuse a license or whether to grant
it conditionally upon the basis of reciprocity.2 12
5. Attitudes towards
International Cooperation
The Nederlandsche Bank's 1984 annual report is not optimistic about
finding solutions for the LDC debt crisis. 213 However, representatives of
both Dutch commercial banks and the Nederlandsche Bank have expressed
support for continuing or enhanced roles for the BIS, IMF and World
Bank.214 They are uniformly opposed to new international agencies, such as
a debt discount agency, which would provide more dramatic "solutions" for
the LDC debt crisis. 15 Dr. William Duisenberg, head of the Nederlandsche
Bank, has stated that even central banks should not be more involved than
they already are in the international debt crisis. 21 6 Solvency ratios of Dutch
banks showed improvement in 1984 and this is viewed as an encouraging
representatives, the provisions of this Act shall be applicable only insofar as the business in the
Netherlands of these enterprises and institutions is concerned."
209. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at secs. 2 and 3. Section 2 states that "lain
enterprise or institution shall only be permitted to engage in the business of a credit institution
after it has received a license to do so from the Bank."
210. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 66.
211. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at sec. 27(1). Sec. 27(1) states that, "Enterprises
and institutions referred to in sec. 1(5) shall keep separate accounts for their business in this
country."
212. Dutch Banking Act, supra note 152, at sec. 7(2).
213. Nederlandsche Bank, Annual Report (1984); J. Brown, Central Bank: Exchange Rate
Policy Precedes Bank Profits, Fin. Times, July 8, 1985, Special Section IV, The Netherlands:
Banking, Investment and Finance, at 24.
214. Interviews, senior officials of major commercial banks, Amsterdam, Feb. 3 and 6, 1984
(notes on file with author).
215. Id.
216. Spinks, Pragmatist Rather Than an Idealist, Fin. Times, July 8, 1985, Special Section
IV, The Netherlands: Banking, Investment and Finance, at 24.
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indication of the comparatively strong general financial condition of Dutch
banks.217 However, commercial bankers as well as representatives of the
Nederlandsche Bank cited a need for greater cooperation and restraint by
supervisory authorities in creditor countries where lax supervisory systems
have permitted tax havens or lightly supervised subsidiaries of foreign banks
to flourish.21 8
Dutch commercial banks are convinced that the LDC debt crisis will be a
problem for the international banking community for the foreseeable fu-
ture. While noting the positive developments of 1984, the annual reports of
both Algemene Bank Nederland and AMRO Bank stressed the need for a
continued focus on creating the conditions for an ultimate solution to the
problem.2 19 Mr. H. Johannes Witteveen, Chairman of the Group of Thirty
and former director of the IMF has outlined his views for greater interna-
tional cooperation in a number of public settings. In Witteveen's opinion,
the problem for which a solution must be found is "how to stimulate bank
lending now, while establishing discipline for the future.
220
IV. Bank Regulation and Supervision
in Switzerland
A. GENERALLY
A few large commercial banks dominate the Swiss banking system, and,
in this respect, it bears some similarity to the West German and Dutch
systems. 221 However, both the Swiss National Bank and the Federal Bank-
ing Commission assume more modest regulatory responsibilities than their
West German or Dutch counterparts. In contrast to the Bundesbank and the
Nederlandsche Bank, the Swiss National Bank has no prudential supervi-
sory role and rather serves as interested and concerned advisor to the Swiss
banking community. The Federal Banking Commission is also relatively
weaker than the German FBSO. The supervisory system itself is primarily
prudential rather than rule-based and in this respect it is closer to the U.K.
system than the German or U.S. systems of bank supervision. 222
217. Interviews, senior officials of the Netherlandsche Bank and Dutch commercial banks,
Amsterdam, June 3, 1985 (notes on file with author).
218. Id.
219. AMRO Bank Annual Report 1984, at 11; Algemene Bank Nederland, Annual Report
1984, at 32.
220. Lecture by H. Johannes Witteveen, given before the Per Jacobsson Foundation,
entitled Developing a New International Monetary System: A Long-Term View, in Washington,
D.C. (Sept. 25, 1983).
221. The so-called "Big Five" banks include the Union Bank of Switzerland, the Swiss Bank
Corporation, Credit Suisse, Suisse Volksbank and Bank Leu.
222. An important distinction from the United Kingdom, however, is that there is no daily
dialogue on supervisory matters between the Swiss National Bank or the Federal Banking
Commission and commercial banks.
VOL. 20. NO. I
INTERNATIONAL BANK LENDING: PART II 189
The concept of bank secrecy in Switzerland is well-known.223 Bank
officers who disclose confidential information may be subject to penalties
under Swiss banking law as well as under Swiss criminal law, which makes it
a punishable offense to reveal information that is harmful to the Swiss state
to representatives of a foreign country. 224 Moreover, the applicable tax
treaty between the U.S. and Switzerland allows the United States to pene-
trate Swiss secrecy laws only when a tax infringement constitutes a criminal
offense under the laws of both the United States and Switzerland. 225 Com-
mercial banks expect and receive confidential treatment for all statistics and
most other information they submit to bank regulators and supervisors.226
Recent proposals to change bank secrecy laws were rejected in a referen-
dum of the Swiss electorate in May 1984.227 A 1985 OECD draft recom-
mendation requesting governments to amend bank secrecy regulations so
that information could be passed across borders to tax authorities has also
been vigorously opposed by the Swiss commercial banking community.228
A trend towards deregulation of capital markets in certain other coun-
tries, notably the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and
the Netherlands, has been met with only limited acceptance in Switzerland.
However, the Swiss National Bank announced in late October of 1985 that it
was reappraising its capital markets policy. Under the proposed changes,
Swiss franc bonds, or dual-currency issues featuring Swiss francs, could be
223. Wilkinson and Zoller, Switzerland, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 2,
at 201.
224. Id.; article 47 of the Federal Banking Law imposes penalties on bank officers who
disclose confidential information and para. 273 of the Swiss Criminal Law makes it a punishable
offense to divulge anything to the disadvantage of the Swiss state to representatives of a foreign
country.
225. Dullforce, Swiss Beat Off U.S. Legal Assault, Fin. Times, Apr. 23, 1985.
226. Swiss Bankers' Association and Swiss National Bank, Agreement on the Observance
of Care by the Banks in Accepting Funds and the Practice of Banking Secrecy, July 1,1982. The
continuing importance of this confidential treatment was emphasized in interviews with officials
of various commercial banks in Zurich in Feb. of 1984.
227. Swiss Reject Bank Secrecy Reform, Fin. Times, May 21, 1984, at 20; Swiss Voters Reject
Initiative for Weakening Secrecy Laws, 42 WASH. FIN. REP. 907, May 28, 1984. Subsequently,
the State Council voted not to allow Swiss authorities to provide information to foreign
governments on alleged fiscal wrongdoing unless a specific breach of Swiss law could be proved.
House of Swiss Parliament Votes to Limit Disclosure by Authorities, 42 WASH. FIN. REP. 988,
June 11, 1984. In July of 1984, however, the Swiss government implemented some changes in
the Swiss Banking Law that were to increase cooperation with regulators, like the SEC, in other
countries in preventing use of Swiss bank accounts for illegal purposes by foreigners. Swiss
Government Announces Plans for Revising Bank Secrecy Laws in 1985.43 WASH. FIN. REP. 39,
July 9, 1984. As of Jan. 1985, the changes appeared to have little effect. See, Swiss at Last
Moving on Loopholes, AM. BANKER, Jan. 11, 1985, at 2.
228. Dullforce, Swiss Bankers Fight OECD Attempts to Ease Bank Secrecy, Fin. Times, June
17, 1985, at 2.
WINTER 1986
190 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
underwritten by banks outside Switzerland as long as there were Swiss
participants in the syndicate.229
1. Swiss Banking Law
Swiss law relating to banking institutions is based on arts. 31 (quarter 1)
and 39 of the Swiss Federal Constitution.23 ° Pursuant to art. 31 (quarter 1),
the federal government is authorized to promulgate statutes and regulations
affecting the banking sector. Art. 39 sets forth the duties of the Swiss
National Bank and regulates the issue of bank notes. The following laws
relating to banks and banking in Switzerland are currently in force: the
Federal Law Relating to Banks and Savings Banks of November 8, 1934, as
amended on March 11, 1971 (the Swiss Banking Law); the Implementing
Ordinance of May 17, 1972 (the Implementing Ordinance); and the Federal
Law Relating to the Swiss National Bank of December 23, 1953, as amended
December 15, 1978 (the Swiss National Bank Law).
After the Swiss government's defeat in the 1984 referendum on bank
secrecy laws, it dropped an earlier proposal for a comprehensive revision of
the Swiss Banking Law. However, certain partial revisions and reforms are
still under serious consideration. Among them are proposals to increase
government controls over finance companies. Currently, finance companies
require no specific authorization from bank supervisory authorities prior to
commencing business, but are subject to reporting requirements if they
solicit deposits from the public and to certain capital export restrictions.231
2. The Federal Banking Commission
and the Swiss National Bank
The highest supervisory and implementing authority for the Swiss Bank-
ing Law is the Federal Banking Commission, elected by the Federal Council
of the Swiss Parliament and under its direct control.232 The functions of the
Federal Banking Commission include issuing implementing regulations for
the Swiss Banking Law and supervising bank auditing procedures.233 While
229. Dullforce, Swiss Review Policy on Capital Market Issues, Fin. Times, Oct. 25, 1985,
at 1.
230. Swiss Legislation Affecting the Monetary and Banking Sectors, at 3-4 (introduction) in
Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Federal Banking Law (Zurich, updated 1980). See, generally
B. KLEINER, DIE GESETZGEBUNG UBER DAS BANKWESEN IN BUND UND KANTONEN (Zurich 1972).
231. Dullforce, Determined to Maintain Competitive Position, Fin. Times, Dec. 13, 1985,
Section III, Switzerland: Banking, Finance and Investment, at 2.
232. The seven members of the Federal Banking Commission are assisted by a secretariat
located in Berne which has been somewhat strengthened and expanded in recent years. Bank
Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 81.
233. Swiss Banking Law, art. 23; Implementing Ordinance, art. 50. The original German
version is set forth in Bundesgesetz uber die Banken and Sparkassen, 51 Amtliche Sammlung
der Bundesgesetz und Verordnungen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (1936, as
amended).
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the Federal Banking Commission is required to report on its activities to the
Federal Council at least once a year,234 it enjoys great independence in
exercising its supervisory authority. The Federal Banking Commission has
broad supervisory powers, ranging from suggestions for change to with-
drawal of a license to actual liquidation of a bank under its jurisdiction. 235
The Federal Banking Commission is charged with the general monitoring
of compliance by banks with the Federal Banking Law. The audit and
control functions of the Federal Banking Commission are generally dele-
gated to recognized audit firms which conduct actual bank audits. Other
responsibilities of the Federal Banking Commission include granting and
withdrawing bank licenses, determining which audit firms shall be recog-
nized to act as bank auditors, issuing statements concerning bank audit and
reporting practices, and reviewing applications from banks wishing to ex-
ceed lending and other limits. 23
6
The Swiss National Bank Law assigns basic responsibility for monetary
policy to the Swiss National Bank.237 Pursuant to an agreement between the
Swiss National Bank and the Federal Banking Commission, the Swiss
National Bank also takes a strong consultative interest in bank supervisory
matters and discusses important issues with the Federal Banking Commis-
sion on an informal basis.238
In addition, the Swiss National Bank collects and analyzes certain in-
formation submitted by commercial banks. Banks are required, for exam-
ple, to provide their annual balance sheets to the Swiss National Bank.239
Moreover, "whenever the size of a bank or the nature of its business
activities warrant it," the Swiss National Bank may require the submission
of detailed semiannual balance sheets. 240 Banks are required to inform the
Swiss National Bank before they conclude or participate in certain business
transactions, including loans to foreign borrowers.2 41
234. Swiss Banking Law, at art. 23(3).
235. Swiss Banking Law, at art. 23; Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at
81.
236. Wilkinson and Zoller, Switzerland, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 2,
at 193-94.
237. Swiss National Bank Law, art. 2(1) provides that "[t]he principal tasks of the National
Bank consist of regulating the circulation of money within the country, facilitating payment
transactions and pursuing a credit and monetary policy advancing the national interest." The
original German version of the Swiss National Bank Law is set forth in Bundesgesetz uber die
Schweizerische Nationalbank in Sammlung der Eidgenossischen Gesetze, as amended.
238. Interviews, senior officials of Swiss National Bank, Zurich, Feb. 22, 1984 and June 4,
1985 (notes on file with author).
239. Swiss Banking Law, art. 7(1).
240. Swiss Banking Law, art. 7(2) provides that the Swiss National Bank may demand from
the banks additional disclosures concerning balance sheets.
241. Swiss Banking Law, art. 8(2).
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3. Commercial Banks and
the Supervisory Process
One unique aspect of bank supervision in Switzerland is the role of the
Swiss Bankers' Association, which serves as the collective voice of Swiss
commercial banks.242 The Swiss Bankers' Association is invited to comment
on any proposed bank legislation. 243 The small number of large Swiss
commercial banks creates the possibility for frequent exchanges of views
among the banks, the Federal Banking Commission and the Swiss Bankers'
Association. Commercial banks emphasize that they are very conservative
institutions which have traditionally adhered to policies of self-restraint in
matters of lending and general business practices. 244 They view regulation
by the Federal Banking Commission as a supplementary restraint on their
banking business but not the primary one. 4 5 Capital adequacy and liquidity
ratios (discussed below) are viewed as easily met prudential guidelines




Swiss corporate law imposes certain auditing requirements on all corpora-
tions. These are supplemented in the case of banks by special requirements
of the Federal Banking Law and the Implementing Ordinance. Swiss corpo-
rate law states that all corporations must appoint a statutory auditor who
reports to the general annual meeting of shareholders whether books have
been properly kept and whether financial statements have been prepared in
accordance with applicable statutory provisions.
247
Bank auditors have a special status under Swiss law and perform impor-
tant tasks in connection with the supervision of banks. 248 Auditors are
appointed and paid for by the banks but are licensed by the Federal Banking
Commission and act as its agents. 249 Arts. 43-49 of the Implementing
Ordinance identify certain specific points on which bank auditors must
comment. These include such matters as potential loan losses and related
242. DALE, BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 52, at 55.
243. In the words of a senior official of the Swiss Bankers' Association, it "serves a somewhat
unique function in that it serves as a 'representative of a concerned group' which must be
consulted in times of crisis or proposed legislation." Interview, senior officials of Swiss Bankers'
Association, Basle, Feb. 21, 1984.




247. Wilkinson and Zoller, Switzerland, in INTERNATIONAL BANK AccouNTING, supra note 2,
at 196.
248. Swiss Banking Law, at art. 20(l).
249. Swiss Banking Law, at arts. 18-22, Implementing Ordinance, at arts. 34-49 [hereinafter
referred to as Implementing Ordinance].
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reserves, the treatment of interest on doubtful accounts, coverage for poten-
tial losses on contingent liabilities, risks on foreign exchange transactions
and any breaches of legal lending limits. 25t Bank auditors are required to
make certain that all violations of Swiss Banking Law are quickly corrected
or reported to the Federal Banking Commission. 25' The Federal Banking
Commission is authorized to demand access to a bank's audit reports and
may also require that any reports prepared by the auditing firm for its own
use with respect to a particular bank be turned over to it for examination.
252
The Swiss Banking Law prescribes standards for yearly statements of
condition as well as statements of profit and loss which must be submitted for
review by the Federal Banking Commission. In addition, banks meeting
specific asset requirements must publish quarterly and semiannual
statements. 253 These financial statements are made public, but the public
does not have access to reports prepared by bank auditors. 254
B. REGULATIONS AND RATIOS
1. Loans to Single Borrowers
Loans to individual borrowers. measured as a proportion of a bank's
capital, are generally required not to exceed 20 percent for unsecured loans,
40 percent for secured loans and 50 percent for loans to other banks. 256 If
these limits are exceeded, that fact must be reported to the Federal Banking
Commission, which may require that some loans be reduced. Lending limits
must be observed on a consolidated basis. Since consolidation requirements
were not in effect at the time art. 21(4) of the Implementing Ordinance was
adopted, some banks objected that limits on loans to individual borrowers
250. Implementing Ordinance, at arts. 43-49; Wilkinson and Zoller, Switzerland, in
INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 2, at 196.
251. The auditor's report on a particular bank must regularly express a definite opinion with
respect to certain matters, including identification of risks, value adjustments of assets, provi-
sions and undisclosed reserves established to cover losses, the treatment of interest on doubtful
claims, compliance with the minimum capital and liquidity ratio requirements, and the observ-
ance of legal and statutory provisions regarding allocations to reserves. Implementing Ordi-
nance, art. 44 (c), (d), (k), (1), (m).
252. Swiss Banking Law, art. 23 (bis) 2; Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7,
at 87.
253. Swiss Banking Law, art. 6(3), provides that banks with a balance sheet total of over SF
50 million must prepare half-yearly interim balance sheets and those with a total of over SF 200
million, quarterly balance sheets.
254. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 88.
255. Art. 21(5) of the Implementing Ordinance states that "legally independent companies
and persons interlocked via their equity capital to an extent exceeding 50 percent are treated as
one unit."
256. Implementing Ordinance, art. 21(4). The consolidation requirement prevents Swiss
banks from placing excess loans through subsidiaries, as has been the practice until recently
among German banks.
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should be applied on an unconsolidated basis. The matter was eventually
decided by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, which upheld the Federal
Banking Commission's practice of applying lending limits on a consolidated
basis.25 7
2. Capital Adequacy
The preparation of consolidated balance sheets has been required since
1978,258 and minimum capital adequacy ratios have been imposed on the
basis of such consolidated balance sheets since 1981.259 Required capital
ratios are graduated according to the presumed riskiness of different types
of assets and are based on the-asset structure of each bank. 260 An additional
capital requirement of 1.5 percent is required on the total of foreign assets
included in the balance sheet. The ratios are guidelines rather than strict
limits and may be varied by the Federal Banking Commission in special
cases. The Federal Banking Commission is authorized to require additional
capital for banks which are heavily engaged in international lending. 26' The
capital ratios of major Swiss banks are generally high.262
Pursuant to the terms of the Swiss Code of Obligations, all Swiss corpora-
tions, including banks, may set up hidden reserves. The means used by
banks to set up such reserves include excess provisions for bad debts and
foreign exchange fluctuations, and undervaluation of securities, foreign
currencies, properties and fixed assets generally.263
3. Liquidity
Banks are required to maintain an adequate balance of liquid and market-
257. Swiss Federal Supreme Court, decision of Mar. 30, 1982, In re "Bank X" v. Federal
Banking Commission, Federal Banking Commission, Bulletin No. 12, July 1983, at 5, cited in
Muller, The Approach Taken by Switzerland to Consolidated Supervision, ISSUES IN BANK
REGULATION, at 32-35 (Summer 1984).
258. The Federal Banking Commission requires that banks file consolidated balance sheets
including all subsidiaries either wholly owned or held with a controlling participation. Muller,
supra note 257, at 33.
259. Arts. I11 to 13 (provisions on capital adequacy) of the Implementing Ordinance became
effective on Jan. 1, 1981. Muller, supra note 257, at 33; Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten,
supra note 7, at 84.
260. Capital is defined to include paid-in capital, published and undisclosed reserves and
subordinated debt having at least seven years to maturity up to a maximum of ten percent of
total capital.
261. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 84.
262. Dullforce, UBS Plays to Its Strengths, Fin. Times, July 2, 1985, at 23. As of Dec. 31,
1984, for example, the capital ratio of the Union Bank of Switzerland was 5.1% of total assets,
not including hidden reserves. Shareholders' equity was over SFr 7 billion and there were also
some SFr 674 million in subordinated debentures outstanding at the end of the year.
263. Swiss Code of Obligations. The original German version is set forth at Schweizerisches
Obligationenrecht, 26th Teil: Die Aktiengesellschaft (22d ed. 1982, as amended).
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able assets in relation to short-term liabilities. 264 Periodically, banks are
required to file liquidity statements in accordance with a prescribed form.2 65
The relevant articles of the Implementing Ordinance provide that a bank
must maintain the total of its liquid assets and easily marketable assets at a
given percentage of its short-term liabilities, normally set at 6 percent, but
established in accordance with formulas set forth in the Implementing
Ordinance.
4. Foreign Exchange Exposure
Open positions in foreign currencies are subject to special capital ade-
quacy specifications.266 Moreover, if the total foreign exchange exposure of
a bank exceeds 40 percent of capital, it must inform the Federal Banking
Commission.26 7 Other than these requirements, there are no specific limits
on foreign exchange exposure. However, the Federal Banking Commission
places a strong emphasis on the adequacy of internal control procedures.268
C. SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING
1. Country Risk and Provisions
for Loan Losses
The Swiss Banking Law provides that the issuance of foreign loans and the
granting of credits to foreign borrowers is subject to prior authorization if
such transactions amount to 10 million Swiss francs or more and are for a
period of more than one year.
269
The Federal Banking Commission has recently completed a major survey
of approaches to country risk analysis utilized by various banks under its
jurisdiction.270 While the Federal Banking Commission does not impose
specific methods for such analysis, it does require that banks engaged in
significant foreign lending develop and use a reasonably sophisticated sys-
tem of country risk analysis. 271 Additionally, auditors' reports are expected
to contain information about the country risk systems used by each bank, as
well as to comment on the country risk characteristics of a bank's interna-
264. Required ratios are set forth in arts. 15 through 19 of the Implementing Ordinance.
265. Article 20 of the Implementing Ordinance; the required form is set forth at app. 1 to the
Implementing Ordinance.
266. DALE, BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 52, at 55.
267. Federal Banking Commission, Circular, Dec. 19, 1984; Bank Supervision in the Group
of Ten, supra note 7, at 87.
268. DALE, BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 52, at 57.
269. Swiss Banking Law, art. 8; Swiss NATIONAL BANK, 1984 Annual Report, at 16 (1985).
270. Interview, senior officials of Federal Banking Commission, Berne, Feb. 21, 1984 (notes
on file with author).
271. Id. For a description of the system used by the Swiss Bank Corporation, see Philipp,
Swiss Bank Corporation's Approach to Country Risk Assessment, (Swiss Bank Corporation)
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROSPECTS (No. 2, 1983).
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tional loan portfolio.272 As a complement to country risk analysis, each bank
is expected to make appropriate provisions for potential loan losses.2 73
Recently, the Federal Banking Commission has begun to require that all
banks make provisions of 20 to 30 percent for loans extended to specified
problem countries.274
The Swiss National Bank also has an interest in banks' analysis of country
risk. Beginning with fiscal 1984, banks have been required to report country
exposure to the Swiss National Bank on a consolidated basis,275 In practice,
however, the Swiss National Bank is very cautious in its suggestions to
commercial banks about the extent of their country risk exposure. The Swiss
National Bank's view is that a bank's own managers should be totally
responsible for country risk analysis. The Swiss National Bank believes that
it would be obligated to serve as a lender of last resort in cases of excessive
country risk exposure if it assumed an active supervisory role.276
2. Lender of Last Resort
The powers of the Swiss National Bank enumerated in the Swiss Banking
Law do not include the lender of last resort function.277 However, the
general expectation is that, in a liquidity crisis, the Swiss National Bank
would provide funds to banks under its jurisdiction, but only if such banks
assigned marketable assets to the Swiss National Bank.27 s In a solvency
crisis, the expectation is that the Swiss National Bank would not intervene.
A solvency crisis would be viewed as the responsibility of individual
banks.2 79
272. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 86.
273. If necessary, such provisions could be made from hidden reserves.
274. Interview, senior officials of Federal Banking Commission, Berne, Feb. 21, 1984 (notes
on file with author); Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 86; Dullforce,
Determined to Maintain Competitive Position, Fin. Times, Dec. 13, 1985, III Switzerland:
Banking, Finance and Investment, at 2. It is important to note also that Swiss commercial banks
have a comparatively modest exposure in Latin America and Eastern Europe. See, for exam-
ple, the figures set forth in Table 94 in Swiss National Bank, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE BANKWESEN
IM JAHRE 1982, at 272-73 (Zurich, 1983).
275. Interview, senior officials of Swiss National Bank, Zurich, Feb. 22, 1984 (notes on file
with author).
276. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 86.
277. In the words of one Swiss commercial bank official, "it is unlikely that a lender of last
resort would be needed by Swiss banks because they have strong capital positions, large
reserves and relatively modest exposures." Interview, Zurich, Feb. 22, 1984 (notes on file with
author).
278. Interviews, senior officials of Swiss National Bank, Zurich, Feb. 22, 1984 and June 4,
1985 (notes on file with author).
279. Id.
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3. Treatment of Branches and Subsidiaries
of Swiss Banks Operating Abroad
No special domestic authorization is required for Swiss banks that wish to
establish branches or subsidiaries abroad. The Federal Banking Commis-
sion requires that Swiss banks prepare balance sheets and statements of
income on a consolidated basis and Swiss branches and subsidiaries located
abroad must generally meet requirements that are imposed on Swiss banks
operating domestically. 80
4. Treatment of Foreign Banks
Operating in Switzerland
Foreign-controlled banks and Swiss branches of foreign banks comprise a
significant part of the Swiss commercial banking community. Changes
adopted in 1984 eliminated a requirement that foreign branches meet inde-
pendent capital requirements and this has encouraged the establishment of
additional branches of foreign banks.28' In fact, over the past ten years, the
number of foreign banking institutions has grown from about one hundred
twenty to nearly two hundred, making Switzerland one of the largest inter-
national financial centers. Not all of the two hundred are commercial
banking entities, however, with more than fifty of the newly established
banks being so-called "finance companies." Such finance companies now
account for seventy-three, or more than one-third, of all foreign banking
institutions in Switzerland, compared with a much smaller percentage ten
years earlier.282 Commercial banks have criticized the Federal Banking
Commission for interpreting reciprocity rules too liberally in allowing for-
eigners to set up finance companies in Switzerland.283
Generally, the Swiss Banking Law applies without distinction to all
banks conducting business in Switzerland.284 The Ordinance Relating to
Branches of Foreign Banks in Switzerland applies requirements for regula-
tory approvals, ratios, financial statement presentation and audits to
branches of foreign banks.285 Thus, branches and subsidiaries of foreign
280. Interview, senior officials of Federal Banking Commission, Berne, Feb. 21, 1984 (the
officials cited a recent case in which a Swiss court held that a Cayman Islands subsidiary of a
Swiss bank was subject to Swiss Banking Law); Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra
note 7, at 83-84.
281. Parry, Foreign Banks Do Well in Switzerland, AM. BANKER, June 17, 1985, at 2.
282. Lascelles, Marked Change in Character, Fin. Times, Dec. 13, 1985, Section Ii, Switzer-
land: Banking, Finance and Investment, at 3.
283. Dullforce, Determined to Maintain Competitive Position, Fin. Times, Dec. 13, 1985,
Section III, Switzerland: Banking, Finance and Investment, at 2.
284. One exception is that, as of mid-1984, branches of foreign banks were not required to
maintain minimum capital ratios but rather were required to hold 10 percent of their assets in
Switzerland. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 84.
285. Wilkinson and Zoller, Switzerland, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 2,
at 194.
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banks are subject to regulation by the Federal Banking Commission to the
same extent as if they were domestic banks.286 They are also required to
provide assurances to the Swiss National Bank that they will comply with
Swiss credit and monetary policies.287
Certain additional requirements apply to branches and subsidiaries of
foreign banks. Such entities are required to demonstrate that reciprocity is
granted to Swiss banks in their home countries and to select a name which




The attitudes of Swiss commercial banks and bank supervisory authorities
towards the LDC debt crisis are influenced by the rather modest claims
against developing countries held by Swiss commercial banks. According to
one estimate, "no more than 15 percent of the foreign assets, i.e., about 5
percent of the total balance sheet, are claims against developing countries
and eastern Europe. 289 While more than 20 percent of foreign assets of
United States banks represent claims against Latin American borrowers,
only about 6 percent of Swiss banks' foreign assets represent such claims.290
Thus, a prevalent feeling is that for the Swiss banking community as a whole,
the extent to which interbank business with established money market
countries might be jeopardized by the LDC debt crisis is more important
than the solution worked out for direct loans to developing countries. 2
91
The importance of strong economic growth in both industrial and de-
veloping countries is a common theme of Swiss commercial bankers. Swiss
Bank Corporation's annual report for 1984, for example, noted that some
progress had been made in establishing the necessary preconditions for
LDCs to return to solvency. However, the report also observed that high
United States interest rates continued to impose a serious burden on de-
veloping countries because of their impact on debt service requirements. 292
Many Swiss commercial bankers emphasize that long-term solutions to the
LDC debt crisis can be developed only if developing countries open their
286. In the fall of 1983, the Federal Banking Commission warned several Swiss affiliates and
subsidiaries of large U.S. banks that it considered their provisions for potential loan losses to be
inadequate. McDermott, Changes on the Domestic Front are Inevitable, Fin. Times, Nov. 8,
1983, Pt. IV, Switzerland: Banking and Finance, at 4.
287. Bank Supervision in the Group of Ten, supra note 7, at 82.
288. Wilkinson and Zoller, Switzerland, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 2,
at 194.
289. R. T. Boni, International Indebtedness and the Swiss Banks, in (Swiss Bank Corpora-
tion) ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROSPECTS, at 7 (June-July 1984).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Swiss BANK CORPORATION, 1984 Annual Report, at 13 (1985).
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markets freely to Western investment. Some Swiss bankers have noted that
they expect to see a period of much more "forced lending" or a rescheduling
of existing debts as a percentage of new money to be loaned in conjunction
with the IMF. Under this scenario, banks would have to lend money,
whether they liked it or not. 93
While Swiss commercial banks and regulators are generally opposed to
the transfer of regulatory authority to an international agency, they favor
cooperation along the lines suggested by the Basle Concordat. Proposed
amendments to the Swiss Banking Law which would provide a basis for
exchanging information with bank supervisory authorities in other countries
are currently under serious consideration.2 94 The attitude of many Swiss
commercial bankers is summarized in the following statement by the Chair-
man of the Swiss Bank Corporation:
The soundness of the international banking system, however, would be consider-
ably reinforced by an early international harmonization of the ratio requirements
on a comparable basis. It would be desirable for the Bank for International
Settlements to do even more than it already has as an advocate for such efforts in
individual countries, because bank supervision in most states is the province of the
central banks, and it is these authorities who are usually called upon when
individual banks run into difficulties.
295
A greater cooperative role for Switzerland within the present institutional
framework remains a distinct possibility. Herr Otto Stich, Finance Minister,
has stated that Switzerland would consider joining the IMF and the World
Bank even if the Swiss electorate votes against UN membership when that
issue is decided in 1985 or 1986.296
The so-called "Baker Plan," which is discussed in more detail below, was
supported with some reluctance by Swiss banks. A draft letter of intent,
reflecting the agreement of Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Cor-
poration and Credit Suisse to participate in the extension of specified
amounts of new lending to certain LDCs over a three-year period, was
prepared in December of 1985.297
293. Parry, Is the Swiss Credit Boat Full? AM. BANKER, Oct. 2, 1985, at 25.
294. Interview, senior officials of Federal Banking Commission, Berne, Feb. 21,1984 (notes
on file with author).
295. H. Strasser, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Swiss Bank Corporation, Speech,
Mar. 29, 1983, reprinted in Swiss Bank Corporation, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROSPECTS at 9
(No. 2, 1983).
296. Swiss May Join IMF and World Bank, Fin. Times, Sept. 24, 1984, at 7.
297. Dullforce, Swiss Banks Adopt a Cautious Approach to Baker Debt Plan, Fin. Times,
Dec. 18, 1985, at 2.
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V. The Role of International Supervision:
Some Policy Suggestions
A. THE INADEQUACIES OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM
Goals of disclosure, safety and soundness, competition, preventing exces-
sive swings in bank lending and serving domestic and international eco-
nomic needs are not being met by the present supervisory framework.
Distinctive domestic bank supervisory approaches, weak cross-border co-
operation among supervisory authorities and inadequate attention to super-
visory matters at the international level have contributed to the current
LDC debt crisis and are making its early and lasting resolution difficult.
1. Domestic Policy Failures
In the United States, the Comptroller, the FRB and the FDIC have
developed separate approaches to the supervision of international lending.
Their differing philosophies reflect the history of the dual banking system as
well as the needs and interests of the banking institutions they supervise.
Recent attempts at coordination by the three agencies do not negate their
distinct concerns. Despite pressures to extend and coordinate regulations as
the "price to be paid" for increased IMF funding, United States bank
supervisory authorities have followed narrowly focused and rule-based
approaches to supervising international lending.
Traditionally the United Kingdom system of bank regulation and supervi-
sion has been based primarily on informal communication between the
Bank of England and major commercial banks. A rule-based system has
been viewed as unnecessary because of the small number of major commer-
cial banks (Barclays, Lloyds, National Westminster and Midland), the
physical proximity of the Bank of England to each of the four, and the
long-standing pattern of frequent extensive discussions between senior bank
officers and representatives of the Bank of England. Shared expectations,
rather than explicit rules, have constituted the basis of bank regulation and
supervision in the United Kingdom. The frequently expressed belief of both
commercial bankers and supervisors is that rules generate loopholes and
that a flexible system based on close cooperation between supervisors and
banks will be most effective. The effect of amendments to the United
Kingdom Banking Act proposed in late 1985 would be to replace at least
some of the traditional flexibility with specific regulations.
Like the United States system of bank regulation and supervision, the
West German approach to bank supervision is largely rule-based. In
contrast to the United States, there is only one primary supervisory au-
thority, the FBSO. Also unlike the United States, there is a constant for-
mal and informal dialogue among the largest German banking institutions
(Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank and Westdeutsche Lan-
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desbank Gironzentrale), the FBSO and the Bundesbank. The net result has
been, in Andrew Spindler's words, a "pattern . . . of quiet consensus,
enhanced by official sensitivity to the banks' financial interests and the
banks' responsiveness to government incentives and suasion. 298 The open
lines of communication have made the development of rules much easier
than has been the case in the United States and the small number of major
banking institutions has insured their relatively uniform application. The
Herstatt crisis and the SMH crisis have led to a focus on bank safety and
soundness, especially with respect to preventing foreign subsidiaries from
engaging in risky lending. However, despite such concerns, rules on con-
solidation have yet to be fully implemented.
In Japan, the system of administrative guidance, with its encouragement
of open, continuous communications between the thirteen largest commer-
cial banks, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan, bears a superficial
resemblance to the United Kingdom system. However, to a much greater
extent than has been the case in the United Kingdom, Japan's bank super-
visory authorities have "shaped the country's banking system and effected
the allocation of its resources through a broad range of signals, incentives,
legally mandated supervision, and administrative guidance. '299 The in-
fluence of the largest Japanese commercial banks on the supervisors is
significant, but it falls short of the influence enjoyed by the largest banks in
the Federal Republic of Germany or in the United Kingdom. The Japanese
government has traditionally been expected to lead in the operation of the
financial markets and to interfere when necessary in the conduct of the
banking business.
The nationalizations of 1945 and 1982, supplemented by the recently
adopted French Banking Act, have created a new relationship between
banks and bank supervisors in France. The French Banking Act and the
extensive written regulations which implement its provisions enable the
Banque de France and the Commission Bancaire to exert a powerful author-
ity over large French banks. An emphasis on the development of a banking
industry that will serve the needs of French industrial policy and support
French exports pervades the French system. Despite recent changes, regula-
tions on capital adequacy and liquidity are not as completely or as strictly
enforced as in similar regulations in the German or Dutch systems. Major
French banks have adopted sophisticated systems for country risk analysis,
but the French Banking Act does not impose any specific limits on inter-
national lending. The Banque de France is reluctant to accept responsibility
for acting as a lender of last resort in the event of a solvency or liquidity
crisis.
298. A. SPINDLER, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIT: PRIVATE FINANCE AND FOREIGN
POLICY IN GERMANY AND JAPAN, at 191 (1984) [hereinafter cited as SPINDLER].
299. Id.
WINTER 1986
202 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
At the apex of the Belgian bank regulatory and supervisory structure is
the Belgian Commission Bancaire, a regulatory body which has tempered its
broad potential authority by following a cautious supervisory approach.
Auditors are assigned general responsibility for monitoring the solvency,
liquidity and profitability of particular banks and are expected to prepare
reports in accordance with comprehensive accounting-related statutes and
guidelines. The Belgian Commission Bancaire has issued specific regula-
tions with respect to capital adequacy ratios to be maintained by commercial
banks, but has not adopted formal liquidity regulations. A new system of
detailed reporting on country risk exposure was introduced by the Belgian
Commission Bancaire in March of 1984. While support would be provided
by the Banque Nationale de Belgique and the IRG in a liquidity crisis, it is
more difficult to predict what responsibilities such entities might assume in a
true solvency crisis.
The Nederlandsche Bank is responsible for implementing the Dutch
Banking Act and adopting regulations that govern banks in the Nether-
lands. The bank regulatory system directed by the Nederlandsche Bank is
complex and rule-oriented, particularly with respect to matters such as
capital adequacy and liquidity. However, frequent informal contacts be-
tween the central bank and senior officers of major commercial banks make
the system a consultative one as well. For example, formal reporting proce-
dures for country risk are supplemented by semiannual meetings between
the Nederlandsche Bank and commercial bank officers to discuss broad
questions relating to country risk. Dutch commercial banks do not expect
the Nederlandsche Bank to act as a lender of last resort except in the case of
an international financial crisis. Representatives of both Dutch commercial
banks and the Nederlandsche Bank have expressed support for continuing
or enhanced roles for the BIS. IMF and World Bank.
Switzerland has a supervisory framework containing elements of both the
rule-based systems of the United States and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the more consultative system of the United Kingdom. The Swiss
Banking Law sets forth a number of specific rules to be followed by Swiss
banks, but the Federal Banking Commission has asserted its authority to be
flexible when interpreting these rules and dealing with particular issues. The
regulatory system reflects the tradition of confidentiality and secrecy which
has long been characteristic of the Swiss banking system.
In sum, the bank supervisory systems discussed here and the factors
influencing their development are diverse. The rules governing the rela-
tionship between government supervisors and central banks, the standards
for accounting and disclosure, regulations and ratios directed at the prudent
conduct of banking business, and the specific rules for country risk, lender of
last resort and supervision of foreign branches and foreign banks are often
inconsistent. Reflecting differing traditions and concerns, each of the super-
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visory systems emphasizes the regulation of somewhat different aspects of
the international lending process. This should not be the case in an era when
consistent and effective domestic supervisory systems would facilitate a
smoother functioning of international financial markets and could form an
important part of a long-term resolution of the LDC debt crisis.
2. The Need for Supervision of the Interbank
Market and Offshore Banking Centers
As noted by David Holland, head of the International Division, Bank of
England, "the international interbank market has evolved rapidly over the
last two decades and now plays a key role in the process of international
financial intermediation." 300 To date, a number of key aspects of interbank
market are largely unregulated even though they present certain risks for
individual banks and for the international banking system generally. At
present there are no supervisory mechanisms to insure that banks treat the
credit risk, mismatch risk and interest risk presented by the interbank
market with due caution.30'
One problem is that there is no generally accepted manner of assessing
creditworthiness of other banks. As a BIS report on the interbank market
notes, "in general, interbank business tends to be viewed automatically by
banks as a relatively good risk, particularly where prime banks are
concerned., 30 2 The BIS report continues with the observation that it may
well be inappropriate to regard interbank lending to all banks as being of the
same low risk:
Not all banks have well diversified portfolios, and not all banks are well-managed.
There are also variations in the supervision banks receive .... Although these
differences can be important, banks' monitoring procedures may not always make
adequate distinction between the riskiness of lending to different banks in the
market.
Offshore banking centers3t 3 have traditionally been a haven for unreg-
ulated activities by subsidiaries and branches of commercial banks. While
the activities of branches and subsidiaries under offshore jurisdiction have
gradually come under increased scrutiny because of the imposition of con-
solidated reporting requirements by domestic bank supervisory authorities,
300. D. Holland, Role of the International Interbank Market, ISSUES IN BANK REGULATION, at
147 (Summer 1984).
301. For a general discussion of the international interbank market and the effect of its
widespread use on the vulnerability of the international banking system, see GUTrENTAG AND
HERRING, PRUDENTIAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTERBANK MARKET (1984).
302. BIS, Monetary and Economic Department, The International Interbank Market: A
Descriptive Study, BIS ECONOMIC PAPERS, No. 8, July 1983, at 34.
303. The commonly acknowledged offshore banking centers include the Bahamas, Bahrain,
Barbados, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey,
Netherlands Antilles, Panama and Singapore.
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much remains to be done in the area of cooperation between domestic and
offshore supervisors and among offshore supervisors. An Offshore Group
of Banking Supervisors (the Offshore Group) first met in Basle in October,
1980 and has convened on several occasions since that time.
304
The offshore banking problem has another and more serious dimension in
the well-known linkage between crime and secrecy in the use of offshore
banks and companies. 3115 Tax evasion and drug-trafficking are the most
serious consequences of largely unregulated offshore markets but the prob-
lems of Banco Ambrosiano and SMH are also illustrative of the need for
better supervision of offshore markets. If "offshore" Luxembourg had
maintained stricter controls over banking entities operating within its terri-
tory, Banco Ambrosiano and SMH might never have occurred.
3. The Need for International Cooperation
a. Generally
As Richard Dale has noted, "... the framework within which interna-
tional banking is conducted and its impact on bank behavior . . . creates
instability and needs to be overhauled." 30 6 Bank regulation and supervision
in each of the creditor countries considered in this analysis has focused on
particular problems affecting domestic commercial banks. Systemic prob-
lems affecting international financial markets are given insufficient atten-
tion, a are the general economic problems of LDC countries. In the
absence of an international approach to bank regulation and supervision,
there is no effective framework to deal with these broad problems. In
addition, uniform standards of disclosure and of safety and soundness
cannot be imposed effectively in the absence of an international consensus
as to appropriate disclosure and safety and soundness measures. A final
inadequacy of the present domestically based supervisory approach is the
lack of an international forum capable of generating and encouraging crea-
tive supervisory responses to problems arising in connection with the LDC
debt crisis.
304. C. Powell, Offshore Group or Banking Supervisors, ISSUES IN BANK REGULATION, at
11-14 (Summer 1984).
305. See generally, Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, Hearings
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations and Government Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983).
306. Dale, A Better Way Out of the World Debt Crisis, Fin. Times, Apr. 30, 1983; see also
H. Wallich, International Lending and the Role of Bank Supervisory Cooperation, PROCEEDINGS
OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BANKING SUPERVISORS, (Washington, Sept. 1981) [herein-
after referred to as Proceedings]: "But there is a need to individually adapt our national laws
and practices into an international framework so that they will accommodate and support each
other instead of creating gaps or even conflicts that could pose a threat to the world-wide
system." Id., at 9.
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b. Efforts to Coordinate
Domestic Policies
The Committee on Bank Regulation and Supervisory Practices (the
Cooke Committee) was formed in 1974 as an unofficial arm of the BIS. The
Cooke Committee met for the first time in February 1975 and has met
regularly three or four times a year since then. 30 7 Gradually, the Cooke
Committee has become an important force in the improvement of domestic
regulation of international lending and the advancement of cooperation
among domestic regulatory authorities. 30 8 The main purpose of the Cooke
Committee is to provide a forum for the discussion of policy issues affecting
domestic supervision of international lending. To date, the Cooke Commit-
tee's practical effectiveness has been limited by the need to rely on voluntary
compliance with its informal and broadly drawn guidelines.30 9
The most important work product of the Cooke Committee has been the
Basle Concordat, first written in 1975 and subsequently revised in 1983. In
both the original and amended versions, the focus was on the allocation of
supervisory responsibility for branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks.
310
The 1983 version attempted to overcome some of the ambiguities of the 1975
version by providing precise guidelines for the supervision of banks with
subsidiaries operating abroad. 311 However, it has been criticized by some
307. W. P. Cooke, Basle Supervisors' Committee, ISSUES IN BANK REGULATION at 7 (Summer
1984).
308. It is significant that conflicts among United States bank regulators have extended even
to the Cooke Committee. In testimony on the IMF legislation, for example, William Isaac
complained about the lack of official status for the FDIC on the Cooke Committee. Until
recently, the FDIC had access to information discussed at Cooke Committee meetings but did
not participate in them. Statement of William M. Isaac, International Lending, Hearing Before
House Subcomm. on Financial Institutions, Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 20 and 21, 1983),
Report No. 98-16, at 231.
309. International Lending, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Super-
vision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., at 16 (1983).
310. The 1975 version of the Basle Concordat contained the following key principles: (a)
Parent and host countries have joint responsibility for the supervision of foreign banking
establishments; (b) host countries have primary responsibility for the supervision of liquidity;
(c) the supervision of solvency is essentially a matter for the parent authority in the case of
foreign branches and primarily the responsibility of the host authority in the case of foreign
subsidiaries; and (d) the exchange of information between host and parent authorities is to be
encouraged. See Dale, The Basle Concordat: Lessons from Ambrosiano, THE BANKER (Sept.
1983) (hereinafter cited as Dale, Basle Concordat], at 55.
311. Most importantly, the 1975 version failed to address problems of differing supervisory
standards. It left unclear the allocation of supervisory responsibilities between host country and
parent bank supervisors for subsidiaries operating abroad, and failed to give a definite answer
to the question of whether central banks could be expected to serve as lenders of last resort in
the event of a crisis. Dale, Basle Concordat, supra note 310, at 55. A further impetus for the
1983 version of the Basle Concordat was provided by the collapse of Banco Ambrosiano in the
summer of 1982. The collapse of Banco Ambrosiano's Luxembourg subsidiary provided a clear
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observers for its failure to provide a definitive guide to the assumption of
lender of last resort responsibilities in the event of various liquidity or
solvency crises.
31 2
Of course, there have been attempts outside the Cooke Committee to
promote cooperation and coordination among domestic bank supervisory
systems. One report has stated that, "while contacts between national
supervisors were scanty and mostly of a bilateral character until the early
1970s, the past decade has witnessed a remarkable advance in international
cooperation in the sphere of banking supervision. ' ' 313 Groups of experts
within the BIS, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (the OECD) and the EEC have focused on ways to improve member
countries' bank supervisory systems. 31 4 Within the EEC, there have been
some tentative attempts to harmonize laws affecting solvency and liquidity
requirements. 31 5 The EEC has also urged member states to adopt consoli-
dated reporting requirements for credit institutions. 31 6
example of differing views on the responsibility for providing lender of last resort facilities, the
precise circumstances under which the lender of last resort function should be exercised and the
nature of a parent bank's legal and moral responsibilities towards its foreign subsidiaries. The
problem in Banco Ambrosiano's case was that Italian authorities felt a limited responsibility for
a foreign subsidiary whose activities were beyond their control while the authorities in Luxem-
bourg were of the view that local subsidiaries of foreign banks were the responsibility of parent
country authorities. G. Johnson and R. Abrams, Aspects of the International Banking Safety
Net, at 24 (Washington: IMF, 1982).
312. The 1983 version states categorically that it does not address the lender of last resort
function. However, there appears to be an implicit recognition that parent bank supervisory
authorities are likely to have lender of last resort responsibilities under most foreseeable
circumstances.
313. R. Peccioli, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF BANKING: POLICY ISSUES (OECD, 1983).
314. See Bank for International Settlements, Fifty- Third Annual Report. The Eurocurrency
Standing Committee, created by the Group of Ten central bank governors under the direction
of BIS in 1980, deals with need for heightened surveillance because of the "appearance of acute
external debt problems in major borrower countries." For a description of OECD efforts, see
Pecchioli, at 105. The Contact Group of the EEC Group of the Bank Supervisory Authorities
(the Contact Group) was established in 1972 to facilitate the exchange of information among
supervisory authorities of EEC member states. For a discussion of the major activities of the
Contact Group, see M. Schneider, The Contact Group of EEC Supervisory Authorities, ISSUES
IN BANK REGULATION, at 15-18 (Summer 1984). In 1979, the EEC's Advisory Committee for
Banking Coordination was formed. See Bonnardin, Proceedings, supra note 306, at 61-70.
315. See, e.g., art. 6 of the First Council Directive of 12th Dec. 1977, on the coordination of
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the
business of credit institutions. Official Journal of the European Communities, 17th Dec. 1977,
No. L322. See also Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General Financial
Institutions and Taxation, Report to the Banking Advisory Committee on the Liquidity
Observation Ratio (May 1982); Commission of the European Communities, Banking Advisory
Committee, Notice on the Calculation of Observation Ratios for Assessing Bank Solvency
(Dec. 10, 1982); Commission of the European Communities, Advisory Committee for Banking
Coordination, Notice on the Calculation of Observation Ratios for Assessing the Profitability
of Credit Institutions (Dec. 10, 1982). A general discussion is provided in Clive-Matthews,
Coordination of the Banking Laws of the EEC, INT'L Bus. LAW., at 39 (Oct. 1983).
316. EEC, Council Directive of June 13, 1983 on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a
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c. Past Efforts to Strengthen the
BIS, IMF and World Bank
The current international institutional framework (the BIS, the IMF and
the World Bank) for managing the LDC debt crisis has not been utilized to
full capacity. The BIS is often treated as a short-term bridge financing
mechanism, while the IMF and the World Bank are similarly assigned quite
modest economic roles, except in "crisis" situations. This has resulted in an
unfortunate tendency to ignore the potential of these international institu-
tions for expanded general economic roles and to focus instead on ways in
which they might be used to "end" the debt crisis. The problem with such
proposals for crisis use of the BIS, IMF and World Bank is that they are
suitable only for dealing with an acute crisis and might be implemented in
such a way as to create a separate "crisis" international financial system that
could only slow down real progress in managing LDC debt and global
economic development over the long term. While an international institu-
tional framework should be capable of dealing with "crisis," it should not
assume the worst and prepare only for that unfortunate possibility.
i. Crisis Institutional Reforms. Proposals for the creation of an interna-
tional debt discount agency come within this "crisis solution" pattern.
Under such proposals, an international institution (perhaps a subsidiary of
the IMF or the World Bank) would issue long-term bonds to banks that sell
their claims on the developing countries. Such debt relief would be financed
by interest concessions or discounts from the face value of loans.
3 17
A similar reform measure has been proposed by Felix Rohatyn. He has
suggested that a new international finance agency buy out the claims of
banks against LDCs through the issuance of long-term bonds. In this way,
LDC debt could be stretched out to long-term maturities with reduced
interest rates. Rohatyn acknowledges that the conversion to long-term, low
interest loans would impose a loss on banks that would somehow have to be
shared jointly by bank shareholders, taxpayers and governments. 318 In
addition Rohatyn observes that a possible need for bank capital could arise
out of a major LDC default that required, for legal and accounting reasons,
a loan loss write-off of such magnitude as to impair the capital of major
banks. Therefore, he has proposed that the new international finance
agency also have the authority to acquire preferred stock of banks with
capital problems.31
Consolidated Basis (83/350/EEC), Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L. 193/
18, July 18, 1983.
317. See Kenen, A Bail-Out Plan for the Banks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1983, at D3.
318. F. Rohatyn, Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,
Jan. 17, 1983 (mimeo).
319. F. Rohatyn, THE TWENTY-YEAR CENTURY: ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC FINANCE,
at 52-54 (1983); see also F. Rohatyn, A Plan for Stretching Out Global Debt, Bus. WK., Feb. 21,
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Other proposals for crisis institutional reform abound. One suggestion is
the formation of a new international lending institution to take over the
syndicate lending function from banks with respect to LDC lending. 320
Another suggestion is that the World Bank appoint a syndicate of invest-
ment bankers to sell a debt issue for the World Bank with a 20-year maturity
at 9 percent interest. The proceeds of the sale would be used to buy out LDC
creditors up to an amount equivalent to their participation in the debt issue.
Member countries of the World Bank would guarantee the loan. 32' Gutten-
tag and Herring have outlined, as part of a more comprehensive plan, a
scheme for transforming old LDC debt into "consol certificates." 322 Charles
Meissner has suggested that a new institution funded by private banks be
created to provide balance-of-payments loans to sovereign governments in
conjunction with the IMF and the World Bank.3 23
ii. Crisis Financing Techniques. A number of crisis financing techniques
have been suggested to accompany the institutional responses discussed
above. One proposed solution has been to impose a "cap" on how much the
interest rate on LDC loans could rise.324 If applicable interest rates were to
rise above the cap, excess interest payments would be added to the princi-
pal. Such a cap on interest rates has been suggested by Anthony M.
Solomon, former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and
Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the FRB.325 Alternatively, Mr. Solomon has
suggested a variation of the interest cap idea, with quite similar conse-
quences. Interest payments would be classified with respect to two rates:
"real" interest and the portion of the interest rate represented by inflation.
1983, at 7. A somewhat similar proposal has been made by Robert Z. Aliber, in Statement
Before the Subcomm. on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Apr. 20, 1983. Aliber foresees the potential
decapitalization of U.S. banks as the principal danger inherent in the debt crisis. To prevent
this, Aliber has suggested that a new U.S. government agency buy bank subordinated debt with
common stock warrants attached to replace bank capital. See discussion in Guttentag &
Herring, The Current Crisis in International Banking, BROOKINGS DIScussION PAPERS No. 8,
Dec. 1983, at 42-43. For an argument that proposals such as those of Rohatyn and Aliber are
unrealistic because they ignore economic realities of the commercial banking business, see
Meissner, infra, note 323.
320. Soros, Why System-Wide Reform Is Critical, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1984, at F2.
321. Bombieri, A Large New Role for the World Bank, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1984, at F2.
322. Guttentag & Herring, supra note 319, at 22.
323. Meissner, Debt: Reform Without Governments, FOR. POLICY, at 81-93 (Fall 1984).
324. The problem, of course, is that most developing country debt is based on variable
interest rates which are indexed to rise and fall with U.S. interest rates. There is a growing
recognition that LDCs are already paying too much of their export earnings in interest
payments on outstanding debt. Argentina, for example, spent approximately 85 percent of its
1983 export earnings on interest payments and the average for all Latin American countries in
1983, according to the IMF, was 42.7 percent. Kilborn, Borrowers and Lenders Hunt Solution
to Latin Debt Crisis, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1984, at Al.
325. N.Y. Times, May 7, 1984, at D1. Commercial bankers are generally opposed to such a
cap because of fears that they would lose large amounts of money if interest rates were to rise.
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Debtor countries would be asked to pay the "real" interest rate, or the cost
of the loan in a world without inflation. The remaining interest payments
would be added to principal.326
Yet another variation of a cap on interest rates has been suggested by an
official of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company. In this variation, any
excess interest payments over a capped rate would be added to later interest
payments in periods when international rates fell below the cap rate. Excess
interest payments would be capitalized only if rates stayed above the cap
much of the life of the loan.327
A second crisis financing technique is to spread out debt repayments over
decades rather than over a few years. Some variants utilize the institutional
approaches discussed above (i.e., conversion of outstanding short-term
debt into long-term bonds under the auspices of the IMF or the World
Bank), while others are based on a voluntary conversion of short-term to
long-term debt through existing loan syndicates. The benefits of converting
short-term debt into medium or long-term debt have been outlined by Dr.
Otmar Emminger, former President of the Bundesbank: "A (partial) con-
version of interest maturities into, say, medium-term bonds at fixed interest
rates would enable those banks which feel unable to participate in the 'fresh
money' approach to obtain an instrument which, in case of need, they could
convert into liquidity in the market (perhaps at a discount). 328
A third crisis financing technique that has attracted broad support is the
idea that a cap might be placed on the total allowable indebtedness of each
LDC. 329 Lord Lever has suggested that the IMF might announce "quotas"
of reasonable annual levels of external borrowing for its members. 33() A
similar conclusion was reached by a major study in the United Kingdom,
which emphasized that such guidelines should be advisory rather than
mandatory because banks must retain responsibility for deciding to whom
they will lend.3 3'
iii. The World Bank Initiative of the United States. In October 1985, at the
326. Kilborn, Borrowers and Lenders Hunt Solution to Latin Debt Crisis, N.Y. Times,
May 14, 1984, at Al.
327. Id.; Kahn, Index the Principal on Debt, Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1983, at 24. Indexing the
principal on debt has also been suggested as a way to overcome problems associated with
fluctuating interest rates. One such proposal, made by Herman Kahn in 1983, was that an index
for principal be based on a gross national product deflator.
328. Emminger, Letter to the Editor, Fin. Times, May 7, 1984.
329. Dale, Country Risk and Bank Regulation, THE BANKER 48 (March 1983). Dale argues
that "a central weakness of the international lending market is that countries can engage in
unrestrained and unconditional borrowing to the point where serious funding difficulties arise
and only then are IMF conditions imposed."
330. Lord Lever, Churchill Lecture (Dec. 6, 1982), cited in the HousE OF COMMONS,
TREASURE AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMITrEE (Session 1982-1983), INTERNATIONAL LENDING BY
BANKS, Vol. 1 (Fourth Report) Mar. 15, 1983 at xli [hereinafter cited as Fourth Report].
331. Id.
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joint IMF-World Bank meeting in Seoul, South Korea, Secretary of the
Treasury James Baker called for a "Program for Sustained Growth," a
major new United States initiative with respect to LDC debt and the role of
the World Bank. Baker urged a three-fold emphasis:
First and foremost, the adoption by principal debtor countries of comprehensive
macro-economic and structural policies supported by the international financial
institutions, to promote growth and balance of payments adjustments, and to
reduce inflation.
Second, a continued central role for the IMF, in conjunction with increased and
more effective structural adjustment lending by the multilateral development
banks, both in support of the adoption by principal debtors of market-oriented
policies for growth.
Third, increased lending by the private banks in support of comprehensive
economic adjustment programs.3 32
In practical terms, Baker's proposals meant that the World Bank was to
be encouraged to significantly increase its lending to Latin America. Co-
financing with commercial banks was to be developed and there was a
possibility that the World Bank would guarantee commercial bank loans
"selectively and carefully." Increased lending by private banks in support of
comprehensive economic adjustment programs was also to be encouraged
and Baker expressed the hope that $20-30 billion of new money would be
made available to Latin America by commercial banks. For their part,
principal debtor countries were to be encouraged to develop comprehensive
economic policies that would promote economic growth, facilitate balance
of payments adjustments and reduce inflation. A continued central role for
the IMF was envisioned, but it was to be tempered by a recognition that
dependence on IMF adjustment programs is not enough.333
In large part, the new United States policy approach stemmed from
growing dissatisfaction with the IMF. The IMF's austerity packages had not
encouraged the resumption of voluntary lending by commercial banks.
Moreover, the short-term perspective of the IMF. which looks for economic
improvements in one to three years, was increasingly recognized to be
inadequate. 334 As one United States commercial bank executive com-
mented, "There has got to be a new approach, which allows a resumption of
steady growth in the LDCs and offers them new flows of money, backed up
by some kind of protection for the banking system. But the initiative cannot
come from the IMF because it is living by an orthodoxy which is no longer
accepted. 335 Even Mr. Jacques deLarosiere, managing director of the
332. Montagnon, Baker's Third World Debt Plan, Fin. Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at 4.
333. Martin and Fleming, Cautious Welcome for U.S. Plan on Third World Debt, Fin.
Times, Oct. 7, 1985, at 1; Montagnon, U.S. Debt Move Provides Filip for Co-financing, Fin.
Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at 4.
334. Fleming, The World Bank May Be Moving Centre Stage, Fin. Times, Oct. 4, 1984, at 14.
335. Kaletsky, The Watchdog Loses Some Teeth, Fin. Times, Oct. 3, 1985, at 10.
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IMF, has strongly endorsed a greater role for the IMF in dealing with the
LDC debt crisis. In a major shift in IMF policy, deLarosiere has also stressed
the need for renewed growth in debtor countries.:36
Despite its well-received emphasis on the World Bank, the new United
States initiative is unlikely to fulfill the publicly-stated aims of its propo-
nents. The proposed increases for commercial bank and World Bank loans,
for example, are quite modest and imply an annual growth of only 21/2
percent in total LDC lending over the next few years. 337 Economic models
suggest that much more new money will be required to permit debtor
countries to achieve minimum acceptable levels of economic growth. 338
B. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
1. Generally
The lack of cohesion between economic and supervisory approaches to
the LDC debt crisis is most apparent at the international level, where the
World Bank, the IMF and the BIS provide a structure for further economic
cooperation among creditor countries, but there is no similar international
supervisory body. The suggestions for reform in the regulation and supervi-
sion of international lending outlined below have three basic components
and reflect a belief that consideration should be given to the development of
an international supervisory framework:
- Comprehensive reforms in domestic systems of bank supervision of
international lending should be considered. Government-bank relations,
accounting and disclosure rules, regulation of capital adequacy, liquidity
and foreign exchange exposure, country risk, lender of last resort facilities
and supervision of foreign bank branches and subsidiaries are areas of
common concern for domestic bank regulators. Without significant excep-
tions, domestic bank regulators in the creditor countries discussed in this
analysis would be well-advised to ask some basic questions about their
supervisory efforts: When should international lending decisions be en-
trusted solely to bank management and when and how should governments
be involved? Can better accounting principles and procedures assist in the
development of more prudent lending? How much emphasis should be
placed on capital adequacy ratios and provisions for loan losses? Should
principles of full disclosure be applied to international lending? Does ex-
haustive country risk analysis assure better bank lending decisions? What
can be done to encourage more competent supervision of foreign bank
branches and subsidiaries?
336. Id.
337. Editorial, Welcome Plan on Debt, Fin. Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at 16.
338. See, e.g., Strengthening the LDC Debt Strategy, World Financial Markets (Morgan
Guaranty), Sept.-Oct. 1985.
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- There should be greater international cooperation and more cross-
border information sharing in an attempt to achieve not only better rules for
bank supervision, but more compatible ones. The Cooke Committee's
general efforts and the principles set forth in the Basle Concordat provide an
appropriate starting point. Consideration should be given to developing
means to expand the supervisory authority and influence of the Cooke
Committee.
- A strong international economic framework, with new functions
for the BIS, the IMF and the World Bank should be developed. The BIS
should assume a coordinating function based on voluntary agreement
among major creditor countries. The IMF and World Bank need to be given
enhanced economic responsibilities suitable for both normal and crisis
situations. In conjunction with continued authority to suggest adjustment
policies for debtor countries, consideration might be given to allocating
more power to the IMF with respect to setting limits on interest rates to be
granted by creditor governments and commercial banks to developing coun-
tries following adjustment programs. As needed, the IMF could also
guarantee certain new loans extended by commercial banks in conjunction
with IMF conditionality requirements. The World Bank should develop
more extensive long-term cofinancing and guarantee facilities.
2. Comprehensive Domestic Reforms
a. Government-Bank Relations
Bank supervisory authorities in creditor countries should be given rea-
sonably similar responsibilities for assuring the prudent conduct of inter-
national lending by commercial banks under their jurisdiction, at least with
respect to such basic matters as oversight of capital adequacy, lending limits,
disclosure of financial accounts and consolidated reporting of accounts.
Regulatory and supervisory decisions affecting international lending should
be matters for bank supervisors rather than government officials. In coun-
tries like the United States, where regulatory responsibility is divided
among supervisory agencies, greater efforts at policy coordination should be
initiated.
b. Accounting and Disclosure
It would be advisable for accounting systems which more fairly represent
market values to be adopted with some degree of uniformity in various
creditor countries. At present, significant differences in accounting systems
in each creditor country distort competition in international lending and
make it difficult to achieve realistic cross-border comparisons of bank posi-
tions and the true riskiness of international lending.339 Moreover, published
339. R. DALE & R. MATI-iONE, MANAGING GLOBAL DEBT at 37 (1983) (hereinafter cited as
DALE & MATIONE].
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accounts should reflect market reality to the fullest extent possible because
public confidence in banks cannot be maintained if their books do not
present their true financial condition.
340
Disclosure of country risk exposures, reserves for potential loan losses,
sources of major deposits, and capital adequacy, liquidity and foreign
exchange ratios should be encouraged. It is no longer the case, if indeed it
ever was, that the disclosure of true statements of bank financial positions
could threaten the integrity of the international financial system. In an era
when banks and other corporations compete for the same investors, it
makes sense to encourage full and complete disclosure of relevant financial
information. Both shareholders and depositors are entitled to know how
their funds are being used. Moreover, if disclosure is full and accurate, the
financial markets could operate to discipline banks that are incurring exces-
sive risks. 34'
c. Prudential Rules for Capital Adequacy,
Liquidity and Foreign Exchange Exposure
Not only should disclosure of various financial ratios and positions be
encouraged, but similar rules for calculating them would be desirable. More
needs to be done to strengthen rules for capital adequacy, liquidity and
foreign exchange exposure. The capital adequacy ratios now being refined
in the United States and the liquidity and foreign exchange ratios in effect in
the United Kingdom could serve as useful guides for the development of
similar ratios in all major creditor countries.342
d. Country Risk and Provisions
for Loan Losses
Despite some potential problems of implementation, a uniform limit on
loans to one country by a single bank should be established.343 Limits on
loans to single borrowers, such as the 15 percent limit in effect in the United
States, should be extended. In theory, limiting exposure of a bank to any
one country and thereby diversifying risk appears to be a good idea because
it would mitigate the leverage that countries with very large loans outstand-
ing have over banks.
Moreover, since a country's financial status can change very quickly, a
uniform rather than a risk-differentiated limit appears best.344 Graduated
340. Id.
341. Id. at 38.
342. See generally, DALE & MArrIONE, supra note 339, at 36. They argue that "[r]equiring
banks to increase their capital against prospective losses is one of the few regulatory initiatives
that strengthens the banking system in both the short and the long run."
343. See generally, Note, The Policies Behind Lending Limits: An Argument for a Uniform
Country Exposure Ceiling, 99 HARV. L. REV. 430 (1985).
344. W. Cline, INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND THE STABILITY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY, 102 (1983).
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requirements for general loan loss provisions should be imposed on the basis
of a bank's loan concentrations in individual countries. 345 Additional provi-
sions could be required for rescheduled loans and for doubtful loans.
346
In practice, a serious problem may be that some banks already have such
high single-country exposures that "specifying a limit would either leave
them in violation ... or establish an uncomfortably high level that might
lead other banks to excess." 347 Moreover, specifying a single limit would not
take into account the varying credit needs of large and small countries or
wide differences in credit standing.
348
e. Lender of Last Resort
Parent country supervisory authorities need to assume greater responsi-
bility for the subsidiaries of their banks operating abroad. It is unrealistic to
expect the development of a supranational lender of last resort and the most
pragmatic approach is for domestic central banks to take the lead in setting
new rules. The Basle Concordat has set out some useful general rules with
respect to the operations of foreign branches. These rules should now be
extended to provide that parent supervisory authorities must act as a lender
of last resort for majority-owned bank subsidiaries operating abroad. 349
f. Supervision of Branches and
Subsidiaries Operating Abroad
Parent bank supervisory authorities should assume full responsibility for
foreign branches of banks under their supervision. Subsidiaries present a
more difficult question and the current governing document in this regard,
the Basle Concordat, assigns joint supervisory responsibility to host country
and parent bank supervisory authorities with respect to solvency and liquid-
ity of subsidiaries. It would seem sensible to assign a primary supervisory
345. DALE & MATIONE, supra note 339, at 35; see also Joint Memorandum of the Comptrol-
ler, FRB and FDIC: Program for Improved Supervision and Regulation of International
Lending, submitted to the Chairman of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, Apr. 7, 1983, reprinted in To Increase the U.S. Quota in the International Monetary
Fund and Related Matters, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Trade, Investment
and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983) (H. Rep. 98-17), at 128 [hereinafter cited as the Joint Memorandum]. The Joint
Memorandum takes the position that country differences, the current high exposure of some
banks to particular countries and various political pressures make country limits impossible.
346. See CLINE, supra note 344, at 100-02, for a useful description of possible theoretical
approaches to differentiated country limits.
347. See DALE & MATrIONE, supra note 339, at 37, for a description of other types of
proposals.
348. A distinction between provisions for rescheduled loans and doubtful loans is recom-
mended; Cline, supra note 344, at 99-100. He suggests that provisions for rescheduled loans
should be set at a much lower level than provisions for doubtful loans.
349. On the dangers of the existing ambiguity about lender of last resort facilities for bank
subsidiaries operating abroad, see Guttentag & Herring, The Lender of Last Resort Function in
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role to parent supervisory authorities and a secondary supervisory role to
host country authorities.
3. Supervision of Interbank Market
and Offshore Banking Centers
With respect to the interbank market, domestic supervisory authorities
should be encouraged to insure that commercial banks recognize and fulfill
their own responsibilities, including the setting and regular review of credit
lines for other banks. The work of the Offshore Group to coordinate and
improve supervision of branches and subsidiaries operating within offshore
jurisdictions should be continued and expanded. Of course, commercial
bank operations in the interbank market and in offshore banking centers
would be affected by appropriate changes in the domestic supervision of
such matters as capital adequacy and liquidity.
4. Greater International Cooperation
The Cooke Committee's recognized expertise makes it the logical begin-
ning point for closer cooperation among bank supervisory authorities of
creditor countries. Its scope and powers should be expanded by voluntary
agreement of member countries. The development of an international
supervisory agency, either connected with the Cooke Committee or newly
established, might be considered as one means of creating more uniform
bank supervisory goals, standards and sanctions in the international lending
area. Ideally, sanctions and an enforcement mechanism would accompany
the creation of an international supervisory agency. Of course, there are
difficulties at this point in the absence of generally binding principles of
international law and resulting from basic national sovereignty. However,
there is a useful ground between informal international "conventions" and
formal international law and every attempt should be made to exploit it.
5. A New International Organization Framework
The BIS and the Cooke Committee might assume a coordinating function
based on voluntary agreement among major creditor countries. The official
BIS objective of increased cooperation among central banks would be
furthered by official participation by the United States on its board of
an International Context, PRINCETON ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, No. 151 (May 1983).
For a description of the confusion about applicability of lender of last resort responsibilities
to subsidiaries which has developed over the years with respect to the Basle Concordat, see
R. Dale, Statement Before the Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives, Apr. 20, 1983 (mimeo); W. P. Cooke, Development of Cooperation Among
Bank Supervisory Authorities, BANK OF ENGLAND Rev., at 234-244 (June 1984); and IMF
Survey, July 11, 1983, at 201-04. For an excellent discussion of the lender of last resort question,
see Cline, supra note 344, at 103-104.
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directors. Such official participation would permit the United States to
influence BIS policies more effectively and would facilitate a continued role
for the BIS in arranging short-term multilateral credits for developing
350countries.
The enhanced power of the IMF to impose adjustment programs as a
"trade off" for continued IMF financial support and commercial bank
lending is to be encouraged in the short term. 351 Over the long term,
consideration might be given to allocating more power to the IMF with
respect to setting limits on interest rates on loans granted by creditor
governments and commercial banks to developing countries following
adjustment programs. As needed, the IMF could also guarantee certain new
loans extended by commercial banks in conjunction with IMF conditionality
requirements. 352
The World Bank should develop co-financing facilities and a greater
capacity to act as a crisis mechanism. One aspect of a policy statement set
forth in the World Bank's World Development Report 1984 should be given
particular emphasis. That statement recognized that increases in voluntary
lending by commercial banks over the long-term would be critical to the
restoration of growth momentum in middle-income developing countries. It
also recognized that a successful transition back to fully voluntary lending
would require World Bank lending in support of policy reforms and ex-
tended co-financing, as well as World Bank support for greater private
direct investment.3 53
6. The Limits of Regulatory Reform
The advantage of the above regulatory program is that it is relatively easy
to achieve and builds on current advances that have been made in dealing
350. The BIS reserves a seat for the Federal Reserve Board on its board of directors.
However, the United States has traditionally declined to fill its seat on the board. Therefore,
the United States has been kept out of decisions concerning internal BIS policy matters and
operational decisions. The policy of leaving the United States seat vacant was recently reaf-
firmed. Report to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Secretary of State of United States
Membership in the Bank for International Settlements, Nov. 30, 1984.
351. See Feinberg, To End the Debt Crisis, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1984, at A27.
352. Other observers have suggested a somewhat stronger supervisory role for a new adjunct
facility of the IMF. One suggestion is that such an adjunct should have the authority to
"(1) convene mandatory discussions between a debtor state and its commercial bank creditors;
(2) order the commencement of and preside over debt renegotiation proceedings; (3) pre-
empt unilateral creditor suits; (4) determine fair terms of debt renegotiation and establish a
ceiling on those terms; (5) preclude the parties from undertaking other renegotiation efforts;
(6) permit creditor banks' suits to proceed as a sanction against a debtor which refused to accept
the renegotiated terms, and (7) require the debtor to adopt internal adjustment measures as a
condition to renegotiations." Barnett, Galvis and Gouraige, On Third World Debt, 25 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 83 (1984).
353. World Bank, World Development Report 1984, at 48.
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with the LDC debt crisis. It addresses both the short-term and long-term
aspects of the debt problem. Moreover, it does not destroy the present
international financial structure in an attempt to deal with the current crisis.
The suggested program has the capacity to deal with crisis but also contains
the starting point of desirable gradual reform.
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